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The availability of electricity is an ongoing development of every sector of any economy. 
Studies have proved that many nations not only in Southern Africa but Africa as a whole 
are faced with power deficits and inconsistent supply and distribution of electrical power 
due to various reasons which include lack of sufficient generating sources, faulty 
equipment and unforeseen disturbances in the network. This negatively impacts both the 
quality of life and economic growth. A reliable power system, however, is one that is 
capable of withstanding a wide variety of disturbances and/or failures. This thesis 
assesses the severity of possible disturbances that can occur in the SAPP(Southern 
African Power Pool) network by carrying out a contingency ranking then verifying these 
results by performing a contingency analysis in DIgSILENT PowerFactory. By so doing, we 
are then able to affirm how reliable and secure the SAPP network is in accordance with 
the N-1 criteria. In this research, focus is given to two of the most critical and common 
failures to occur in a power system which are transmission line failure and generation unit 
failure. Both of which can cause alterations in the voltages of the transmission system and 
power flow thereby justifying why performing a contingency analysis allows one to 
determine which violations have been made after a disturbance occurs in the system. The 
result simulations reveal that the SAPP network is not secure in accordance with the N-1 
criterion with the faults induced by the Harib-Kokerboom 1 transmission line and the 
Synchronous machine (2) generator contingencies being the most severe. Both 
contingencies led to voltage and thermal loading violations.  This research is particularly 
important because it allows demonstrates some of the measures that can be put in place 
to mitigate the effects of unforeseen disturbances and failures that could occur in any 
given network.  
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an organization that was formed in 
Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980, following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration [1]. The 
Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) which has replaced the Co-ordination Conference was signed at the Summit of 
Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. SADC was 
established to build a regional community which would provide peace, security, 
cooperation in fields of shared interests, and ultimately an integrated economy [2]. The 
organization provides a forum where regional planning is carried out with the goal of 
encouraging self-sustaining development in Southern Africa, which is based on collective 
self-reliance and inter-dependence of Member States. It is built on the principle of 
achieving sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment.  
Under the patronage of SADC is the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), whose primary 
aim is to provide reliable and economical electricity to its customers. It is a cooperation of 
12 national electricity companies in the Southern part of Africa and was the first formal 
international power pool to be created in Africa in 1995 [3]. The SAPP member countries 
include; Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see 
Fig.1). SAPP has facilitated broadband infrastructure in SADC in order to efficiently and 
effectively trade electricity among the countries utilizing cheap electricity generated by 
coal-fired thermal plants in South Africa and abundant hydropower potential in neighboring 
countries. The organization’s other objectives include [4];  
 To increase power accessibility in rural communities. 
 Implement strategies in support of sustainable development priorities. 
 Provide a forum for the development of a world class, robust, safe, efficient, 
reliable and stable interconnected electrical system in the Southern African region 
 Harmonize relationships between member utilities. 
 Co-ordinate and enforce common regional standards of Quality of supply (QoS); 
measurement and monitoring of system performance. 
 Facilitate the development of regional expertise through training programs and 
research. 
In order to effectively achieve its aims and objectives, the organization created a trading 
platform that enables the export and import of electrical power between the member 
states. This is carried out through three main trading platforms;  
(i.) Bilateral trading - This involves the barter trade exclusively between two states 
without the use of hard currency for payment.  
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(ii.) Day ahead trading market (DAM) - Contracts are made between buyer and seller 
for the delivery of power and the following day the price is set and the trade is 
agreed upon. 
(iii.) Post day ahead trading market (PDAM) - Unlike DAM, the price is set prior to 
deliver.  
By 2013, SAPP comprised of a membership of 16 utility companies which also includes 
Independent Power Producers (IPP) and Independent Transmission Companies (ITC) 
from the 12 member countries shown in table 1-1. Whilst most of the utility companies are 
operational (OP), some are declared to be non-operational (NP), and others are merely 
observers (OB). 
 
Table 1- 1: SAPP member state utilities 
 
Utility Status Abbreviation Country
Botswana power corporation OP BPC Botswana
Electricidade de Mocazmbique OP EDM Mozambique
Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi NP ESCOM Malawi
Empresa Nacional de Elecricidade NP ENE Angola
Electricity Supply Corporation OP ESKOM South Africa
Lesotho Electricity Corporation OP LEC Lesotho
Namibia Power Corporation OP NAMPOWER Namibia
Societe Nationale d'Electricite OP SNEL DRC
Swaziland Electricity Board OP SEB Swaziland
Tanzania Electricity Supply Commission NP TANESCO Tanzania
Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation Limited OP ZESCO Zambia
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Company Ltd OP ZESA Zimbabwe
Copperbelt Energy Corporation ITC CEC Zambia
Lunsefwa Hydro Power Station IPP LHPS Zambia
Hidroelectricia de Cahora Bassa OB HCB Mozambique
Mozambique Transmission Company OB MOTRACO Mozambique
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Figure 1- 1: Member countries of SAPP 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
The number of power outages experienced in the Southern African region has escalated 
over the last decade due to a combination of factors, such as member countries’ 
inadequate electrical power supply system; load growth in areas which were not 
adequately planned for; high population growth and rapid economic expansion [5]. 
Outages have also occurred as a result of technical and operational challenges. Power 
outages and poor quality of supply are often the result of insufficient generation capacity or 
unreliable power network grids. This research investigation seeks to evaluate the reliability 
of the SAPP region by assessing the grid’s security taking mainly into consideration the 
voltage overload, voltage under load and thermal loading of the busbars and transmission 
lines. Security in this case refers to the degree of risk in the power networks ability to 
survive imminent disturbances or contingencies without interruption to customer service 
[6]. Determining the security of the power networks of the individual member states of the 
SAPP region would be inconsistent due to the electrical bilateral contracts they obligate 
allowing for the import and export of electricity amongst the countries [4], hence a much 
suited approached has been taken of analysing the region as a whole. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research study is to investigate the reliability of the SAPP regions power 
network by verifying a particular level of performance in accordance with SAPP standards. 
To adequately carry out the main aim the following areas will be explored; 
 The determination of the region’s generation plant portfolio and high voltage 
transmission system. This is done in preparation for model building and real-time 
digital simulation which will use the acquired information to build a precise model of 
the SAPP network. 
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 Modelling of the high voltage electric power network and interconnections of the 
SAPP using DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 
 Performing a contingency analysis on the SAPP network model using DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory to determine the security status of the SAPP network. 
 Optimizing power flow across the regional network and enhancing the performance 
of the existing SAPP power network by using strategic placement of new 




Every facet of human development is woven around a sound and stable energy supply 
regime [7]. This is why it is important to ensure that there is a constant supply of electricity 
throughout the SAPP region. The first step to achieving continuity of supply is by knowing 
the security status of the regions power grid. Having this information at hand is highly 
advantageous as it can allow for appropriate measures to be taken to improve not only the 
current situation but also make provision for future augmentation if necessary.  
In order to determine the security status of the region, a contingency analysis will be 
carried out on the SAPP model; this will be carried out primarily using DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. Contingency analysis will be advantageous as it can be used to analyze 
which contingencies will cause violations in the power network and allow appropriate 




The hypothesis that this research addresses is; 
The overall reliability of the SAPP network can be enhanced by improving its security via 
methods such as strategic interconnections and placements of interconnection lines. The 
security of the power network is dependent on the severity of the violating limitations 
(thermal loading and bus voltage limits) resulting from contingencies.  
 
1.6 Research questions 
The questions that will be addressed whose answers will lead to the validation of the 
hypothesis are as follows; 
1. How much power is transferred between the member states of the SAPP? 
 
2. When any one generating unit/source has a fault in any one country, what thermal 
loading, bus voltage violations occur in the SAPP network? 
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3. When a disturbance occurs in the SAPP power network, what thermal loadings, 
bus voltage violations are induced? 
1.7 Methodology  
The preliminary network data used in this research was provided by SAPP through the 
support of ESKOM. This information was released under a strict confidentiality agreement 
that it was to be used for research purposes only. From the data received, the SAPP 
network used in this research was modeled and built using DIgSILENT PowerFactory 
whilst further simulations were run using MATLAB. The network was modelled such that 
focus was placed primarily on the interconnection lines between the member countries that 
are involved in the export and import of electricity in the region.  
1.8 Contributions 
The first contribution of this thesis is that it provides a simplified model of the SAPP 
network focusing only on the transmission network that are directly involved in the trading 
process. The second contribution is that a severity of the security analysis of the SAPP 
grid is given in detail with regards to voltage and thermal loading violations for the several 
operating scenarios that have been analysed. This was done using a MATLAB code that 
enables security selection and ranking. Furthermore, some solutions are suggested that 
would enhance the security of the SAPP network.  
1.9 Publications in Journal and Conference proceedings 
Some of the concepts presented in this thesis can be found in the papers published during 
my MSc studies; 
[1]       Mwale. S. J. T, Davidson. I. E, "A Steady-state Contingency Analysis of the SADC 
Regional Grid using the N-1 Criterion”, Journal of Energy and Power Engineering, DOI: 
10.17265/1934-8975, Vol. 9, May 2015 
[2]       Mwale. S. J. T, Davidson. I. E, "Security Analysis of the SADC Regional Electric 
Power Grid Using DigSilent Powerfactory Software Tool”. In Proceedings of the 1st 
Eskom-EPPEI Students’ Conference, Midrand, May 5-6, 2014.  
[3]       Mwale. S. J. T, Davidson. I. E, "SADC Power Grid Reliability - A Steady-state 
Contingency Analysis and Strategic HVDC Interconnections Using the N-1 Criterion”, 2nd 
International Symposium on Energy Challenges and Mechanics, Scotland, United 
Kingdom, 19-21st August 2014 
[4]       Mwale. S. J. T, Davidson. I. E, "Power deficits and outage planning in South Africa”, 
2nd International Symposium on Energy Challenges and Mechanics, Scotland, United 
Kingdom, 19-21st August 2014 
  






In power system operations, it is desired to achieve a balance between power generation 
and load demand to maintain a constant frequency. The load demand of an electric power 
system varies throughout the day and also during different seasons, hence the available 
generation should be able to supply this load at any given time [8]. Electric power is 
becoming more imperative in the modern world and as most power utilizations are 
supplied by the power transmission and distribution system, the security of the power 
system is paid more and more heed to nowadays [9]. Security is one of the two 
counterparts that make up the reliability of a power system, the other is adequacy. 
Reliability can be referred to as the ability of a system to perform its required functions 
under stated conditions and for a specific period of time[10]. This, however, is highly 
dependent on both the security and adequacy; security is the ability of the power system to 
withstand disturbances without causing an impact on its load or quality of service thereof 
[6] and adequacy is the amount of capacity resources needed to meet peak demand [11]. 
According to Singoyi [12] for a power system to be considered secure, it must satisfy the 
N-1 criterion. This means, upon the tripping of any power component (overhead line, 
transformer and generator), no overload must appear on the remaining components. In 
addition, the thermal ratings of the equipment shouldn’t exceed their maximum during the 
outage and the operational limits must be respected whatever the situation. According to 
IEEE 1453 – 2004 standard, under normal conditions the flows must be kept below the 
thermal rating of each network element. The voltage at each bus bar must be kept within a 
tolerance of ±5% of its nominal value. In emergency situations when an element outage 
occurs, the thermal rating of any equipment should not be exceeded and the voltage 
should be kept within 95% and 105% of its nominal value. A 15% over voltage is however 
acceptable for 5 seconds and a 20% over voltage for between 1 second and 2 second.  
Gao [13] states that assurance of a secure state of generation is an essential task of the 
Power System Operator. Making accurate prediction during real time operation for the 
power system can help increase the security of the power system especially after the 
system has been affected by severe contingencies. Unreliability in a power system is 
usually caused by voltage collapse, frequency collapse and also overloading. Lu [14] 
found that as a result of the consequences of deregulation (economic imperatives and 
technical difficulties), the electric power system currently operates close to the security 
limits. And in order to protect the grid against severe contingencies and to increase the 
security margins, the transmission system operators have to take special measures that 
are based on security analysis. The authors proceeded to propose a cyclic security 
analysis methodology which checks the static, dynamic and transient behaviour of a given 
power system. The proposed methodology is able to establish if a certain operating point 
is secure by taking into account the possible contingencies. 
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 According to Cutsem [15], a secure operating limit is the most stressed among a given set 
of operating points, such that the system can withstand specified contingencies. It is a 
general measure of security with respect to incidents, incorporating pre-contingency 
operator or controller actions and post contingency corrective controls. Their proposed 
approach deals with long term voltage stability limits that combine Dichotomic search with 
Quasi Steady State simulators to compute these limits with the efficiency required by real 
time applications. However, according to Bose [6], to secure the system against more 
severe disturbances requires more expensive designs, hence the design criteria are 
chosen to meet an appropriate level of security. In more developed countries, the 
customer is often willing to pay more for minimizing the interruption of power, whereas in 
less developed countries the scarcity of capital and other reasons keep the level of power 
system security lower. Therefore, it is cheaper to have neighbouring utilities provide 
backup electric power supply in case of generator outages and this leads to widespread 
interconnection of the transmission system as was the case in North America and Western 
Europe starting from the 1930’s.  
 
2.2 Power System Reliability and Security 
Power system reliability is the measure of the capability of the electric power network to 
withstand sudden disturbances or unanticipated losses in the system components that can 
be caused by both natural and man-made events[16]. The functionality of power ‘security’ 
and ‘reliability’ makes them counterparts and it is because of this reason that the NERC 
replaced the term power system security by power systems operational reliability. An 
operationally secure network is one that has a low probability of experiencing power 
outage or faults in the equipment. As the availability of electricity is of paramount 
importance in every sector of growth in our communities, it is of vast importance that each 
power grid is of good reliability. A reliable power grid is characterized by the following [12]; 
(i.) The voltages must be within the limits. 
 
(ii.) The grid must be able to withstand the loss of a generator. 
 
(iii.) Must be able to withstand the loss of a transmission line.  
 
(iv.) Must be able to retain stability during a short circuit. 
 
(v.) The generating capacity must be greater than the load demand at any given 
time. 
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    A noticeable sign of an unreliable power grid is frequent power outages or blackouts. 
Despite modern electrical power grids being monitored by trained system operators 
equipped with sophisticated monitors and control systems such as SCADA, large, frequent 
and uncontrolled blackouts are affecting millions of customers around the globe. This 
appears to be a problem that only seems to worsen. It was reported in 1995 that the 
frequent blackout in the USA was 7 days per year, this figure however escalated to 36 
days per year by 2006[17]. In the last decade, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe have had to resort to load-shedding as a stop-gap measure in order to reduce 
demand. South Africa, has been particularly badly hit by energy shortages. South Africa’s 
industrialists say the shortages are costing them billions of South African rand[5]. Mining 
accounts for about 15 per cent of South Africa’s electricity demand. Other countries in the 
region such as Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland, which rely on South Africa for their 
energy supplies, have had to turn to other neighbouring countries for electricity. Increased 
blackout in any region is an indication that there is need for a tool that can inevitably 
predict and prevent blackouts in real time and hence, one possible tool that can be used to 
determine the reliability of a power grid is to perform what is known as a contingency 
analysis [18] explained further in section 2.3. 
With the constant increasingly growth rate of our economies a huge strain is often placed 
on the electrical power networks pushing them closer to their limits. Several electrical 
equipment are constantly being developed and improved so as to help meet the reliability 
and efficiency of such growing networks. Some of the equipment produced for the purpose 
of such include;  
i. Circuit breakers that are designed to be able on command to interrupt currents up 
to full short-circuit rating within milliseconds and without failure.  
ii. Surge arrestors that must limit over voltages within microseconds.  
iii. Voltage and Current transformers, which must continually provide accurate 
measurement data on the load and status of the power system.  
iv. FACTS (Flexible alternating current transmission system) that can be used to 
enhance controllability and increases power transfer capability of the network. 
Transmission quality and efficiency is improved by supplying either inductive or 
capacitive power to the grid. 
In order to accurately model, simulate and test such equipment before they are installed in 
the actual power system, several hardware equipment and software tools and programs 
have been developed. Some of which include the Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory, Powerworld simulator, PSCAD™/EMTDC™ and RSCAD. In 
order to test, simulate and design models of power systems, scaled down models of power 
system components had to be used. The introduction of hardware and software tools have 
not only increased accuracy and flexibility but have also reduced purchase and operating 
costs. Industries, utility companies and research institutions alike have all highly benefited 
from this development [19]. 
The Monte Carlo simulation has for a long period of time been used to assess reliability of 
power systems. This is a technique that is used to understand the risk of impact in which 
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multiple trial runs called simulations are run in the hopes of approximating the probability 
of a certain outcome. The Monte Carlo simulation works by method of selecting a random 
value based on a range of estimates made by experts on the area or past experience. A 
forecasting model (one which plans ahead for the future) is made to which the estimated 
values will be implemented and simulated. The ranges of values were obtained to help the 
programmer understand the risk and uncertainty in the model. The aim of the Monte Carlo 
simulation was to give a clearer picture based on how one creates the estimates, how 
likely the resulting outcomes are. The disadvantage however of this method is that the 
simulation is only good as your estimation. The simulation only represents probabilities 
and not certainties.[20], [21], [22]. 
Power system simulation has long been recognized as an important and necessary step 
not only in network development, but also in the design and testing of power generation 
and transmission systems. Recent advances in both computer hardware and sophisticated 
power system component modelling techniques have significantly increased the 
application of digital simulation in the power system industry. Simulation of a power system 
in the steady state condition is used primarily during either the planning phase or in control 
centers to optimize the steady state system operation. Whilst simulation under dynamic 
and transient conditions are required for complex systems where the performance is 
determined by the power plant control and the control of electronic equipment [23]. The 
study of power system transients deals with events which occur due to disturbance on the 
power system (line faults, breaker switching). Transient simulations are performed in order 
to examine these stresses and to evaluate what effects they will have on the system being 
studied. The results are then used to ensure component ratings are sufficient and that 
appropriate protection devices are in place to prevent damage to components when faults 
occur.  
Advances in digital signal processing together with improvement in accuracy and efficiency 
of power system component models have had a significant effect on digital simulation 
technology. For relatively simple systems, real time operation can be achieved for only 
short periods of time using high end, high speed computer work stations [24], [25] 
Although real time simulation of large scale power systems has long been desired, the 
application of real time simulators was traditionally reserved for small to medium scale 
powers systems (i.e less than 70 buses). Analogue hybrid simulators were physically too 
large and expensive for these systems and fully digital simulations of this size were yet to 
be realized. As a result, large scale simulators were left mainly to non-real transient 
stability programs. The benefits provided by large scale real time simulation of power 
systems was later realized and it was discovered real time electromagnetic transient 
simulations add the following capabilities [26]; 
 Faster results through real time performance 
 Physical protection and control equipment testing 
 More detailed time domain simulation 
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 Detailed analysis of power electronic controllers (e.g HVDC, SVC, TCSC) 
 Real time response for training and education of power system personnel  
2.3 Contingency Analysis 
Power system steady state security is an instantaneous condition as it is a function of time 
and of the robustness of the system with respect to the imminent disturbances[27]. The 
last century has demonstrated that every facet of human development is woven around a 
sound and stable energy supply regime. Some of the factors that threaten the reliability of 
the network include aging infrastructure of both the transmission and distribution 
networks[28]. One method of ensuring a reliable and secure power network is by careful 
monitoring, automation and information management. Such a tool that can be used to 
carry out a power system analysis in this regard is a contingency analysis. CA is the study 
of the outage of elements such as transmission lines, transformers and generators, and 
investigation of the resulting effects on line power flows in the remaining parts of the 
system network. This tool is especially effective during the operation and planning stages 
to study the effect of contingencies. Contingencies referring to disturbances, including 
transmission element outages or generator outages that may cause sudden and large 
changes in both the configuration and state of the system. They often result in severe 
violations of the operating constraints and in many cases lead to power outages [29]. 
Steady state contingency analysis aims at the assessment of the risk that certain 
contingencies may pose to an electrical network in real time. For any system to be 
considered secure it should conform to what is known as the N-1 criterion (section 2.5). 
CA is used also as a study tool for the offline analysis of contingency events and as an 
online tool to show operators what would be the effects of future outages. This allows 
operators to be better prepared to react to outages by using pre planed recovery 
scenarios. During contingency analysis it should be noted that [30]; 
 Security is determined by the system’s ability to withstand equipment failure 
 Weak elements are those that present overloads in the contingency conditions 
(congestion) 
 Standard approach is to perform a single (N-1) contingency analysis simulation 
Contingencies put the whole or part of the power system under stress and this occurs due 
to[10]; 
 Sudden opening of the transmission line 
 Generator tripping 
 Sudden change in the generation 
 Sudden change in the load 
The contingency flow chart used in this research to assess the security of the SAPP model 
has been adapted from Ahmad et al [31] shown in fig. 2-1. 
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Figure 2 - 1: Contingency analysis flow chart [31] 
Ahmad et al [31] carried out a contingency analysis on the Bangladesh power system in 
order to identify the ranking which will aid in knowing the amount of losses for any fault in 
the generator, bus, transformer and the transmission line. It should be noted however, that 
over the years there has been an evolution of contingency analysis methods that have 
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been used dating as early as the 1950’s. There are several methods that can be used to 
analyse the occurrence of a contingency in a network that are separate from the N-1 
criterion, some of which include; the concentric relaxation method [32], the bounding 
method [33], the DC power flow method [34], the ward equivalent method [35]. 
 
2.4 Contingency Ranking and Selection 
In practice, it is often not feasible to carry out a line outage on each independent 
transmission line in an exceptionally larger power system in an effort to study the 
overloading that will occur in the system. As is the case, a contingency ranking is applied 
to identify which lines have a higher probability of causing system overload. There are 
several methods that have been used previously in an effort to assess the extent of the 
security status of a network. Abdallah et.al rendered the development of a contingency 
ranking algorithm which would rank algorithms based on their relative severity as 
desirable. The main objective of this method is to find all the critical cases which are then 
ranked based on their effects on line loading or bus voltages [36]. Albuyeh and Nara used 
what is known as the performance index (PI) which entails a wide system scalar PI so as 
to compute the severity of each case by calculating their PI value ranking them accordingly 
[37], [38]. Another contingency ranking algorithm is the screening method used by Mori et 
al and Hao et al. This particular method is based on approximate power flow solutions to 
eliminate those non-critical contingencies. [39], [40].  
According to Kirschen [41] the N-1 security criterion provides just an impartial perspective 
on the severity of a power system as compared to the risk based approach to security 
assessment which provides significantly more information on which to base operating 
decision. The authors believed that the risk should be measured in terms of expected 
outage costs to the consumers. The risk calculation should not be limited to the reflection 
of the predefined set of contingencies but rather should factor in the actual probabilities of 
the outages leading to load disconnections. They went on to carry out a case study based 
on the IEEE-Reliability Test System showing how different operating points on the systems 
deterministic security boundary vary risk levels. The risk level changes for given operating 
points, considerably ranging between fair, average and bad. The paper also demonstrates 
how the use of adaptive deterministic security boundaries make it possible to compare the 
cost and benefit of relaxing operating limits. The reactive compensation index (RCI) is one 
method that has been used extensively by BC Hydro in Canada for assessing voltage 
stability. In this methodology, the π (pi) section model is used to evaluate the RCI for 
active power flow and compensation injection theorem using only the base case load flow 
under each line outage condition. The method estimates the distance between the pre-
contingency and line outage case nose by using the total reactive injection required at the 
load buses to establish similar voltage levels for both cases. The RCI is formulated as [42]; 
RCI =                                                              (2-1) 
Where;  
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NB  -  number of load buses 
     - reactive power supplied by the artificial shunt compensator at the nth load 
bus for the outage of jth line to maintain the voltage profile as in perfect condition. 
Another methodology is the performance index (PI) given by the equation (2-2) [43]; 
PI =        
  
   
 
                                                            (2-2) 
Where;  
    - active power of line l 
     - transmission capacity of branch l 
     - number of parallel lines for branch l 
    - weighting factor of the line which reflects the influence of a fault 
 L  - Number of branches in the network  
When there is no overloading present, 
  
   
 < 1 and when there is overloading 
  
   
 > 1 and 
the positive exponential element makes the PI relatively large. This index is used to 
generally reflect the power systems security. 
Jagadish et al [44] carried out an experiment in India and used the Remedial Action 
Schemes (RAS) for Contingency Analysis. As the name suggests they are necessary 
actions which need to be taken to solve the violations caused by a contingency. They are 
also defined as Special Protection Schemes (SPS) or System Integration Schemes (SIS). 
The RAS is designed to mitigate specific critical contingencies that initiate the actual 
system problems. There may be a single critical outage or there may be several critical 
single outages for which remedial actions are needed. In order to investigate how far the 
system is from insecure conditions and how a transaction of active power can affect the 
loading of the transmission system, it is necessary to analyse the sensitivities of line flows 
with respect to bus injections. These sensitivities are termed as Power Transfer 
Distribution Factors of i-j elements and for the transaction between m-n is given by the 
formula; 
PTDFij(mn) = 
    
    
                                                  (2-3) 
Where, 
PTDFij(mn) - Power Transfer Distribution Factors for line i-j for transaction between  
m - n 
     - Change in transaction between m and n 
     - Change in the real power flow of line i-j for transaction between m-n 
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The results obtained from this approach proved to be quite accurate and thus providing 
new tools for developing remedial control actions for higher order contingencies.   
System performance indices are not unique and obtain different forms depending on the 
parameters that are of importance to the engineer. However, in selecting a PI, physical 
properties of the system should be taken into consideration. The most common form of 
system PI give a measure of the deviation from rated values of system variables such as 
line flows, bus voltage and bus power injections.  The PI that will be used in this thesis is 
one that will list the contingencies in ranking of severity of line over loads (PIp) and the ‘out 
of limit’ voltages (PIV) given by the equations (2-4) to (2-6) [45]. And in order to get a 
reflection of the reactive power capacity constraints due to generator outages we will apply 
equation (2-7) [46]. 





      
   
  
   
                                               (2-4) 
Where; 
 PIP – Active power index 
   - power flow in MW 
       - MW capacity of the line 
    - Number of lines in the system 
   - Rean-non negative weighing factor = 1 
   – Penalty function = 1 
      = 
    
 
                                                          (2-5) 
Where; 
    - voltage at bus i after load flow 
    - voltage at bus j after load flow 
   - Reactance of the line connecting bus 
  
PIV    
 
  
                           
  
   
               (2-6) 
Where; 
 PIV – Reactive power index 
   - voltage magnitude corresponding to bus i 
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      – specified voltage magnitude corresponding to bus i 
     lim – Voltage deviation limit 
   – Penalty function = 1  
    – Number of buses in the system  
   – Real non-negative weighting factor = 1  
 
        PIV =  
 
  
                           
  
   





      
   
  
   
              (2-7) 
Where:  
 PIV – Reactive power index 
   - voltage magnitude corresponding to bus I  
      – specified voltage magnitude corresponding to bus i 
     lim – Voltage deviation limit 
   – Penalty function = 1  
    – Number of generating units 
   – Real non-negative weighting factor = 1 
      - Reactive power limit at bus i 
    – Reactive power at bus i 
                    
2.5 N-1 Criterion 
The N-1 criterion is one which is used to determine the security status of a power system 
following unpredicted faults and is an abstraction representing a single contingency or the 
outage of any one element following an incident. An ‘N-m’ contingency refers to the loss of 
m components in the power system where m ≥1. As such, a first level contingency where 
only one component is lost during a fault is represented as N-1, a second level fault is 
represented as N-2 and so forth. Therefore, the total number of m contingencies that can 
occur in a power system is represented by the expression CNm, where; m = 0, 1, 2, 3,…, N 
and N = number of elements. The total number of all possible contingencies that can occur 
in a power system is given by the equation; 
TCNm =                                                        (2-8) 





        
                                          (2-9) 
An example given for a small network contingency with N = 10 elements, applying eq (2-
8), the network has the possibility of having ten N-1 contingencies, forty five N-2 
contingencies, one hundred and twenty N-3 contingencies and so on. This is a simple 
illustration of the combinational probabilities of contingencies that can occur in any one 
system. The bigger the network, the more the probabilities, making systematic 
computation of all possible failures requiring an exceptional amount of time to compute. In 
this research, multiple contingencies (N-2 and higher) are disregarded due to the 
magnitude of the case study model and focuses only on first level contingency. 
Two of the most critical and common failures to occur in a power system are the 
transmission line failure and generation unit failure. Both of which can cause alterations in 
the voltages of the transmission system and power flow. This is why performing a 
contingency analysis allows one to determine which violations have been made after a 
disturbance occurs in the system. Even whilst the loss of a generation unit can cause 
additional dynamic problems usually affecting the frequency and operation output, this 
research is limited to the voltage and thermal violations that are reached during and after 
each contingency.   
 
2.5.1 Voltage Violations 
Voltage violations occur at the buses. A violation of the voltage at the bus bar indicates 
that the voltage post contingency at the bus bar has exceeded its acceptable limit of 0.95 – 
1.05pu (per unit) of the nominal voltage. This standard is according to the IEEE which is a 
professional association to which all global standards succumb for a range of industries. 
When a voltage drop occurs post contingency, meaning the voltage at the bus bar is below 
0.95pu of the nominal voltage, there will be a spike in the reactive power as more of it will 
be injected into the bus in an effort to increase the voltage profile at the bus bar. Similarly, 
when a voltage rise occurs post contingency, exceeding the permissible 1.05pu of the 
nominal voltage, a drop in the reactive power will be experienced as more of it will be 
absorbed at the buses to maintain the nominal voltage.  
 
2.5.2 Line MVA Limit / Thermal Overload Violation 
When the MVA rating of the transmission line exceeds its given rating (which varies for 
each kind of transmission line) the line MVA is violated. Transmission lines are known to 
have some level of resistance which results in heat losses causing the transmission line to 
become hotter as more current flows through it. The maximum amount of current that can 
be transferred through a conductor whilst keeping the conductor’s temperature below its 
limit is what is specified as the maximum power in MVA, commonly referred to as the 
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thermal rating of the line. Even while most lines are designed to withstand 125% of the 
thermal limit, some utilities declare a thermal limit ranging between 80% - 90% an alarm 
situation. For purposes of this research however, any line that exceeds 80% of its thermal 
limit will be considered an alarm situation whilst those surpassing 100% their thermal limit 
will be referred to as being overloaded.  
Some of the factors that define the thermal rating of a line include; 
 Current through a conductor 
 Conductor characteristics 
 Location – latitude, elevation, line direction, etc. 



















3.1 SAPP Overview 
The 12 member countries of SAPP have a combined population of approximately 260 
million people dated 2014 and covers a surface area of 9296102 km² and a combined 
GDP of US$655 billion. This is slightly over 1000000 km² of Europe’s 10180000 km² and 
2000000 km² more than Australia [47]. The region has a peak demand of 54000MW 
against a generating capacity of 52000MW which is an improvement considering a deficit 
of recorded 7000MW in 2009[48]. Table 3-1 shows the various energy resources that the 
member countries of SAPP use in the generation of power ranging from hydro, oil and also 
nuclear [49].  
 
Table 3- 1: SAPP member generation sources in MW 
Country Oil Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Total 
Angola 89  174  474 737 
Botswana  132    132 
DRC     2333 2333 
Lesotho     73 73 
Malawi 36    278 314 
Mozambique 64    2122 2186 
Namibia 29 115   240 384 
South Africa 2424 36360  1 616 665 41065 
Swaziland     62 62 
Tanzania 79  640  561 1280 
Zambia 10    1752 1762 
Zimbabwe  1026   750 1776 
Total 2731 37633 814 1616 9310 52104 
 
Like its SAPP member counterparts, South Africa is no exception when it comes to major 
power outages brought about due to rapid economic growth and expansion which have 
contributed to a diminishing generation reserve capacity against an increasing growth in 
demand. The increased electricity demand over the years has been brought about due to 
a vastly increased customer base, economic growth and a late start to the construction of 
new Power plants. Musidza [50] indicates that a joint effort was essential to meet the 
countries estimated 4% GDP growth and the targeted 6% GDP growth and the socio-
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economic imperatives in 2007. Eskom was required to have produced 70% (in MW) with 
the remaining investment balance (30%) attained through private sector participation with 
direct independent power producers (IPPs) and distribution generation (DG) in the power 
generation [51]. This is particularly significant as the country is the largest exporter of 
electrical Power (2000 MW) in Southern Africa and is interconnected to five neighboring 
countries; Botswana at 400kV, Swaziland at 400kV, Namibia at 220kV and 400kV, 
Mozambique at 275kV and 400kV, and Lesotho at 132kV [52]. Eskom generates at least 
75 percent of the SAPP regions electricity with other smaller economies such as 
Zimbabwe generating 4%, DRC 3.4% and Zambia 2.9%. South Africa is historically known 
to have had one of the highest electricity reserve margins worldwide [5]. Reserve margin is 
the excess available capacity above the normal peak demand levels. The South African 
electric power reserve margin has decreased over the years as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 3- 1: South African reserve margin (2002 - 2009) 
 
This has negatively affected the region as a whole. Fig. 3-2 shows a clear increase in the 
consumption of electricity in the SADC region (to which all SAPP members belong) in a 
space period of 4 years (2008 – 2011) despite the failure to increase the electrical power 













Reserve margin (%) 25 16 6 8 
Reserve margin (%) 
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Figure 3- 2: SADC consumption against product (2008 - 2011)[16] 
 
3.2 SAPP Interconnections 
The SAPP interconnection for 2012 has been developed and shown in figure 3-3. Three of 
the member states are non-operational (not yet connected to the SAPP market) which 
include Angola, Malawi and Tanzania. However, plans have been ongoing in an effort to 
connect the above mentioned states to the SAPP grid as depicted in many SAPP reports. 
Padambo [53] reports on a proposal in which Malawi is to be connected to the SAPP 
market through the Mozambican grid to which Zimbabwe and South Africa are also 
connected. Similar plans are being made for Tanzania and Angola. 
This research focuses on the SAPP grid security status which entails the regions ability to 
maintain a continuous and sufficient supply of electrical power to its consumers even after 
a fault has occurred in the networks power grid. Security is one of the variables that make 
reliability in conjunction with adequacy. To assess the networks security, a contingency 
analysis will be carried out on the regions electric grid using the real time simulators known 
as DIgSILENT Powerfactory. In real time simulation, the computer model is executed at 
the same rate as the actual physical system, meaning if it takes a period of one minute for 
an actual physical system to shut down, it will also take one minute for the computer model 
of that same system to shut down. Dynamic contingency analysis is referred to as real-
time. Real time simulation is becoming an essential simulation environment for 
engineering design, especially in power systems [54]. For the reason being that it allows 
the controls to be subjected to everything from steady state to rare emergency operating 
conditions and is ideal for closed loop interaction between the power system and the 
control hardware. 
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Figure 3- 3: SAPP interconnection as of 2012 
 
3.3 SAPP Planning Criteria 
SAPP has put in place a system planning criteria that is to be adhered to during the inter-
utility planning process and is also the same criteria to which this model building and 
simulation of this project will adhere. This system planning has been set to meet the 
minimum requirements of SAPP and ensures that the transmission of electrical power from 
the generators to the load centres is reliable, efficient and economical. In any case the 
development of the transmission system may occur for a number of reasons which include 
but are not limited to; 
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 Reconfiguration, decommissioning and optimization of existing network 
 Changes to customer requirements or networks 
 The introduction of new transmission substations or modification of an existing 
connection between transmission systems 
 The cumulative effect of a number of developments as referred to above 
 
3.3.1 The Planning Process 
SAPP’s planning process follows the phases listed below which is all in accordance with 
the SAPP transmission planning criteria[55]; 
 Identification of the problem 
 Formulation of alternative options to meet the need 
 Study of these options to ensure compliance with agreed technical limits and 
justifiable reliability and quality of supply standards 
 Costing of these options on the basis of approved procedures 
  Determination of the preferred option 
 Building of a business case for the preferred option using the agreed justification 
criteria 
 Request for approval of the preferred option and initiation of execution 
 
3.3.2 Transmission Planning Criteria 
The transmission planning criteria sets out the standards that are applied in the short, 
medium and long term planning period. The primary aim of transmission planning is to 
maintain stable operation of the bulk transmission system for most probable system 
contingencies. The transmission network shall maintain continuity of power supply to 
customers under any single contingency of N-1 contingency. 
3.3.3 Transmission Planning Concepts 
The interconnected transmission system should be capable of performing reliably under a 
wide variety of expected system conditions while continuing to operate within equipment 
and electric system thermal, voltage and stability limits as specified in the SAPP criteria. 
Electric power systems must be planned to withstand contingencies and maintenance 
outages. Extreme event contingencies which measure the robustness of the electric 
system should be evaluated for risks and consequences. 
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3.3.4 Planning Criteria 
Individual members may develop planning criteria that shall, as a minimum, conform to this 
Transmission planning criteria. Individual criteria shall consider the following; 
a) Overload power above nominal being carried in any single transmission circuit, 
multi-circuit transmission line, way leave, as well as through any single 
transmission station shall be avoided.  
b) Inter utility power flows shall not result in risk to the electric system under normal 
and contingency conditions as outlined in this criteria. 
c) Sufficient reactive capacity shall be planned within the SAPP system at appropriate 
places to maintain transmission system voltages within voltage limits or as 
determined by the member under contingency conditions. 
 
3.3.5 Power Transfer Capability 
Transfer capability is the measure of the ability of the interconnected systems to reliably 
move power from one area to another area over all transmission circuits between those 
areas under specific system conditions. Transfer capability is also directional in nature. 
Some major points concerning transfer capability analysis are outlined below; 
a) System Conditions – Base system conditions are identified and modeled for the 
period being analyzed, including projected customer demand generation dispatch, 
system configuration and scheduled power transfers. 
b) Critical Contingencies – During transfer capability studies, both generation and 
transmission system contingencies are evaluated to determine which facility 
outages are most restrictive to the transfer being analysed.  
c) System Limits – The transfer capability of the transmission network can be limited 
by thermal, voltage, stability or contractual considerations.  
 
3.3.6 Contingency Criteria for Long Term Planning Purposes 
 
- With one line or transformer or reactive compensation device out of service (N-1), it 
shall be possible to supply the entire load under all credible system operating 
conditions. 
- A system meeting the N-1 contingency criterion must comply with all relevant 
voltage limits and the applicable current limits, under all system conditions. 
 
3.4 Integration of Power Stations 
 
When the integration of power stations is planned, the following network 
redundancy criteria must apply; 
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3.4.1 Power Stations of Less Than 1000MW  
 With all connecting lines in service, it shall be possible to transmit the total output 
of the power station to the system for any system load condition. If the local area 
depends on the power station for voltage support, the connection shall be made 
with a minimum of two lines. 
 Transient stability shall be maintained following a successfully cleared single phase 
fault. 
 If only a single line is used, it shall have the capability of being switched to 
alternative busbars and be able to go onto bypass at each end of the line. 
3.4.2 Power stations of More Than 1000 MW 
 With one connecting line out of service (N-1), it shall be possible to transmit the 
total output of the power station to the system for any system load condition.  
 With the two most onerous line outages (N-2), it shall be possible to transmit the 
total output of the power station less its smallest unit to the system.  
 Smallest unit installed at the power station shall only include units that are directly 
connected to the transmission system and are centrally dispatched. 
 
i. Transient stability shall be retained for the following conditions; 
 A three phase line or busbar fault, cleared in normal protection times, with the 
system healthy and the most onerous power station loading condition; or 
 A single-phase fault cleared in “bus strips” times, with the system healthy and the 
most onerous power station loading condition; or 
 A single-phase fault, cleared in normal protection times, with any one line out of 
service and the power station loaded to average availability. 
ii. The cost of ensuring transient stability shall be carried by the generator if the 
optimum solution, as determined by the system operator, results in unit or power 
station equipment being installed. 
iii. Busbar layouts shall allow for selection to alternative busbars. In addition, feeders 
must have the ability to go onto bypass. 
iv. The busbar layout shall ensure that no more than 1000MW of generation is lost as 
a result of a single contingency. 
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v. To enable the system operator to successfully integrate new power stations, 
detailed information is required per unit and power station. 
vi. When the integration of a nuclear facility or off-site power supple to a nuclear 
facility is planned, the levels of redundancy and/or reliability of the transmission 
system and off0site power supple requirements specifies in its nuclear operating 
license or by the national nuclear regulator within the country shall apple.   
 
3.5 Voltage Limits and Targets  
The busbar voltages should remain within the following bands under system healthy 
conditions; 
Table 3- 2: SAPP voltage limits 
Network Condition Voltage Limit 
System healthy 0.95 --1.05 p.u. 
After N-1 contingency before corrective 
actions 
0.90 – 1.05 p.u. 
After N-1 contingency after corrective actions  0.95 – 1.05 p.u. 
  
The minimum voltage limit under different contingency conditions for system planning 
studies (after N-1 contingency) should be 0.95 pu unless otherwise specified by the 
customer.  
3.6 Equipment Loading Limits  
 
3.6.1 Transmission Lines 
Utilities shall determine thermal ratings of standard transmission lines and update these 
from time to time. The thermal ratings shall be used as an initial check of line overloading. 
No transmission line should be loaded more than its normal thermal limit under normal 
operating conditions or more than its contingency rating under N-1. 
 
Table 3- 3: SAPP transmission line thermal rating limit 
Network Condition Thermal rating limit 
System healthy Rated A ( Normal rating) 
Under N-1 contingency Rate B ( Contingency rating) 
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3.6.2 Transformers  
No transformer should be loaded more that 100% of its thermal limit under any operating 
conditions 
 
Table 3- 4: SAPP transformer thermal rating 
Network Condition Thermal rating limit  
System healthy Thermal rating of transformers (i.e the 
100% rating) 
Under N-1 contingency Thermal rating of transformers (i.e the 
100% rating)  
 
3.6.3 Series Capacitors 
The maximum steady state current should not exceed the rated current of the series 
capacitor and under normal conditions. Use the International Electrotechnical Commission 
standards (IEC 60143) for cyclic overload capability. 
3.6.4 Shunt Reactive Compensation 
Shunt capacitors shall be able to operate at 30% above their nominal rated current to allow 
for harmonics and voltage up to UM (Maximum continuous voltage on any bus for which 
equipment is designed). 
Reactive compensation, whether new or modified, may cause harmonic resonance 
problems and harmonic resonance studies must be conducted. 
3.7 Shunt Reactive Device Switching 
The size of shunt capacitor and reactor banks is limited by the voltage change caused by 
switching a bank. As a first approximation the per unit voltage change can be determined 
by dividing the capacitor bank size (MVAr) by the three phase fault level in MVA. 
This voltage change when switching shunt devices should not exceed: 
 Three percent (3%) with the system healthy or 
 Five percent (5%) under contingency conditions 
3.8 Circuit Breakers  
Rapturing capacity of circuit breakers should meet the maximum system fault levels and 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAPP NETWORK BUILDING AND LOAD FLOW SIMULATION 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Network Building and Design 
Step 1: The SAPP network model was built using the DIgSILENT PowerFactor. The 
preliminary data that was used to construct the model was provided by SAPP and ESKOM 
(under a strict confiditiality agreement). A reduced equivalent model for each country was 
developed and represented as substations. This was done to eliminate computing 
constraints that were being experienced when the national grids of each country were 
inhtergrated to form the SAPP network model. The models were reduced from a network 
consisting of transmission voltages of 11kV, 33kV, 88kV, 110kV,132kV, 220kV, 275kV, 
330kV and 400kV to a HV model consisiting of transmission voltages of 132kV, 220kV, 
330Kv and 400kV. Appendix 1 shows a summary of the grid information that was collected 
prior to the building of the SAPP model showing a combined total of 1407 busbars for the 
entire region. As shown in appendix 2, the models were built such that only the 
transmssion networks that are directly connected to the SAPP network were included. This 
resulted into the reduced 58 busbar network model on which simultion were run. The 
following procedure was adopted in developing the reduced order equivalent model of the 
SAPP model;  
Step 2: The single line diagrams of the member states of SAPP where built using 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory as shown in the fig.4-2 to 4-10.  
Step 3: Data specifications of each component, namely: power transformers, transmission 
lines, generators, loads, reactors, are inserted using the raw data collected. 
Step 4: The separate models are then interconnected to build one network, each country 
being represented as a substation in the SAPP megastation (fig.4-11). 
Step 5: The thermal ratings of the components and the voltage ratings of the busbars are 
set in DIgSILENT PowerFactory according to the SAPP requirements specified in sections 
3-3 to 3-5.  
Step 6: The models are checked for connectivity to make sure that there will be a constant 
flow of power through each substation. The connectivity of the models are represented in 
seven different colours, each of which represent a split according to how many nodes are 
connected to that particular grid and alson non connectivety according to the the legend in 
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Station Connectivity 
Split 1   
Split 2   
Split 3   
Split 4   
Split 5   
Split >= 6   
Not connected   
Figure 4- 1: Split sections of station connectivity 
 
 
Figure 4-2 shows the HV power network of SEB, Swaziland’s electric power utility 
company. 
 
Figure 4- 2: SEB network model 
29 | P a g e  
 
Figure 4-3 shows the HV power network of NAMPOWER, Namibia’s electric power utility 
company. 
 
Figure 4- 3: NAMPOWER network model 
 




Figure 4- 4: EDM network model 
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Figure 4-5 shows the HV power network of BPC, Botswana’s electric power utility 
company. 
 
Figure 4- 5: BPC network model 
 
Figure 4-6 shows the HV power network of ZESCO, Zambia’s electric power utility 
company. 
 
Figure 4- 6: ZESCO network model 
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Figure 4-7 shows the HV power network of ZESA, Zimbabwe’s electric power utility 
company. 
 
Figure 4- 7: ZESA network model 
 
Figure 4-8 shows South Africa’s ESKOM power utility sectioned into three; ESKOM A, 
ESKOM B and ESKOM C. ESKOM A comprises of the Aries and Aggeneis power station, 
ESKOM B is comprised of the Spitskop power station and ESKOM C the Matimba, Arnot, 
Camden and Normandie power stations. The sections were made simply to enhance 
visibility during presentation taking into consideration the vast size of the ESKOM network 
and by no means reflect any actual fragmantation or division by ESKOM.  
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Figure 4- 8: The three sections of the ESKOM utility as referred to in this research 
 
Figure 4-9 shows the HV power network of ESKOM A, South Africa’s electric power utility 
company.
 
Figure 4- 9: ESKOM A network model 
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Figure 4-10 shows the HV power network of ESKOM B, South Africa’s’s electric power 
utility company. 
 
Figure 4- 10: ESKOM B network model 
Figure 4-11 shows the HV power network of ESKOM C, South Africa’s’s electric power 
utility company. 
 
Figure 4- 11: ESKOM C network model 
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Figure 4-12 displays the SAPP network after interconnecting all the substation in the 
region to create one mega station. The variation in the colour indicates connectivity in the 
station.  
 
Figure 4- 12: SAPP network model 
4.2 Base Case Load Flow Analysis 
A load flow analysis was performed on the SAPP network model in order to obtain the 
base case results comprising of the generator outputs, bus voltage profiles and the line 
flow profiles.  The base case is the network model in its normal steady-state with all 
elements operating as they are expected to, this stage is carried out to obtain a better 
understanding of the changes that the network undergoes from the pre-contingency state 
to post-contingency states. The load flow is carried out in DIgSILENT PowerFactory and 
the results are colour coded in which the lower voltage limits, the upper voltage limits and 
the loading range are represented.  
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Fig.4-13 shows the specification of different ranges of the voltage and thermal limits and 
confirms that after the load flow was run on the SAPP model (fig.4-14), most of its network 




Figure 4- 13: Upper, lower voltage limits and thermal loading legend 
          
 
Voltage limit  
Range Colour  Status 
>= 1.1   Excessively high voltage 
>= 
1.05   
Upper voltage limit 
exceeded 
    Within secure range 
<=0.95   Lower voltage limit exceed 
<= 0.9    Excessively low voltage 
Thermal loading legend 
Range Colour  Status 
<= 80%   Normal  
>= 80%   Activates warning alarm 
>= 100%   
Beyond secure thermal 
loading limit 
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Figure 4-14 displays the SAPP network after a load flow is performed. This is the pre contingency state of the model before any fault 
or disturbance has been applied to any one of the components.  
 
Figure 4- 14: SAPP network model pre-contingency 
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Figure 4-15 shows the SEB substation post contingency with the network operating within the acceptable security limits. 
 
 
Figure 4- 15: SEB substation pre-contingency 
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Figure 4-16 shows the EDM network pre contingency. The busbars are all operating within the required secure limit, with the Matola 
66BB1 busbar operating close to the minimum required limit, as the color indicates.  
 
 
Figure 4- 16: EDM substation pre-contingency 
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Figure 4-17 shows the BPC network pre contingency. Most of the busbars drop below the required minimu nominal volatge of 0.95 
p.u.   
 
 
Figure 4- 17: BPC substation pre-contingency 
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Figure 4-18 shows that the busbar of the ZESCO network pre contingency stays within the acceptable limit. The generators and 
transformers however, are all loaded over 80%. Even whilst this condition is still acceptable, an alarm has been raised for necessary 
action to be taken to prevent any damage if the thermal loading limit is exceeded. 
 
 
Figure 4- 18: ZESCO substation pre-contingency 
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Figure 4-19 shows the ZESA network pre contingency with all but one busbar within the acceptable security limits. The Insakumani 
400 bus 1 busbar drops below the accptable 0.95 p.u of its nominal volatge after the load flow is performed.  
 
 
Figure 4- 19: ZESA substation pre-contingency 
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The ESKOM A network in figure 4-20 shows that all the busbars fall within the required limits pre contingency. One element however, 
the synchronous machine 2 indicates that it undergoes a thermal loading of over 100%. 
 
 
Figure 4- 20: ESKOM A substation pre-contingency 
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The ESKOM B network in figure 4-21 shows a variation in the busbars, some of which are within the acceptable limits and some that 
have dropped beyond the minimum secure limit.  
 
 
Figure 4- 21: ESKOM B substation pre-contingency 
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The ESKOM C network in figure 4-22 shows a combination of results including overloaded generators and transformers, busbars with 
voltages dropped beyond the secure limits, and also some with voltage rises above the acceptable limit.  
 
Figure 4- 22: ESKOM C substation pre-contingency 
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The NAMPOWER network in figure 4-23 shows two busbars that drop beyond the secure limit; the Kokerboom 220 Bus and 
Kokerboom 400 Bus1. The remaining Harib 220 Bus remains in the acceptable secure range.  
 
 
Figure 4- 23: NAMPOWER substation pre-contingency 
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The bus voltage profiles, generator output profile and the line flow profiles of the SAPP 
model base case are presented in tables 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 below respectively . The tables 
contain several indices such as voltage deviation, power factor, voltage magnitudes, 
reactive power and line loadings that are vital in the calculation stage and are all derived 
using the Newton-Raphson solution method in DIgSILENT PowerFactory.  
 
Table 4- 1: SAPP model base case bus voltage profile 







du, Voltage deviation 
% 
Segoditshane 220 Bus 1(1) BPC 220 0.95 13.25 -4.58 
Segoditshane 220 Bus 2 BPC 220 0.95 13.25 -4.58 
Phokoje 220 BB BPC 220 0.88 22.41 -12.32 
Phokoje 400 BB BPC 400 0.93 23.53 -6.76 
Gabarone South No.2 132 
Bus 1 
BPC 132 0.96 12.53 -3.59 
S. Phikiwe 22 BB BPC 220 0.88 22.41 -12.31 
Segoditshane 132 Bus 1 BPC 132 0.96 12.17 -4.01 
Kokerboom 220 Bus NAMPOWER 220 0.93 -5.20 -6.86 
Harib 220 Bus NAMPOWER 220 1.00 -4.65 -0.30 
Kokerboom 400 Bus 1 NAMPOWER 400 0.93 -3.82 -7.16 
Edwaleni 132 BB2 SEB 132 1.00 32.80 -0.44 
Edwaleni 132 BB1S SEB 132 1.00 32.80 -0.44 
Edwaleni 132 BB1N SEB 132 1.00 32.80 -0.44 
Edwaleni 40 BB2 SEB 400 1.00 32.80 -0.44 
Edwaleni 400 BB1 SEB 400 1.02 35.08 2.18 
Infulene 275 BB1 EDM 275 1.02 25.50 2.37 
Matola 275 BB1 EDM 275 1.02 26.03 2.47 
Matola 66BB1 EDM 66 0.98 26.03 -2.41 
Maputo 275 BB1 EDM 275 1.03 26.57 2.54 
Maputo 400 BB EDM 400 1.03 29.46 2.79 
Kariba North 330kV ZESCO 330 1.00 0.11 0.08 
Kariba South 330 ZESA 330 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Insakumani 400 Bus 1 ZESA 400 0.94 22.25 -5.93 
Bindura 330kV bb1.2 ZESA 330 1.03 -4.12 2.57 
132 kV BB1 ZESA 132 1.00 -7.39 0.45 
Aries 400 BB2 ESKOM 400 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Aries 400 BB1 ESKOM 400 1.00 0.00 0.00 
47 | P a g e  
 







du, Voltage deviation 
% 
Aries 400 BB Traction+ ESKOM 400 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Aggeneis 66 BB2 ESKOM 66 0.98 -3.79 -2.05 
Aggeneis 66 BB1 ESKOM 66 0.98 -3.79 -2.05 
Aggeneis 220 BB2 ESKOM 220 0.98 -2.64 -2.03 
Aggeneis 220 BB1 ESKOM 220 0.98 -2.64 -2.03 
Matimba 400 BB1 B6 ESKOM 400 0.93 29.95 -6.92 
Matimba 400 BB2 B3 ESKOM 400 0.93 30.33 -6.94 
Spitskop 400 BB2A ESKOM 400 0.93 30.06 -7.12 
Spitskop 400 BB1A ESKOM 400 0.93 30.06 -7.12 
Spitskop 275 BB1 ESKOM 275 0.97 29.73 -2.68 
Spitskop 275 BB2 ESKOM 275 0.98 30.06 -2.24 
TerminalSpitskop 132 BB1 A ESKOM 132 0.95 27.09 -4.92 
Spitskop 132 BB2A ESKOM 132 1.00 17.44 0.00 
Aggeneis 400 BB1(1) ESKOM 400 0.99 -1.76 -0.82 
Aggeneis 400 BB1 ESKOM 400 0.99 -1.76 -0.82 
Gen 5 ESKOM 20 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Gen 4 ESKOM 20 1.00 0.43 0.00 
Gen3 ESKOM 20 1.00 0.43 0.00 
Gen 2 ESKOM 20 1.00 0.43 0.00 
Gen 1 ESKOM 20 1.00 0.43 0.00 
Gen 6 ESKOM 20 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Arnot 400 BB1S ESKOM 400 1.04 30.09 4.35 
Arnot 400 BB2S ESKOM 400 1.04 30.05 4.29 
Camden 400 BB2W ESKOM 400 1.02 41.39 1.86 
Normandie 88 BB2 ESKOM 88 1.00 35.06 0.29 
Normandie 88 BB1 ESKOM 88 1.02 39.21 2.03 
Nomandie 400 BB2 ESKOM 400 1.01 39.21 0.76 
Nomandie 400 BB1 ESKOM 400 1.01 39.21 0.76 
Normandie 132 BB1 ESKOM 132 1.01 35.29 0.92 
Normandie 132 BB2 ESKOM 132 1.01 35.29 0.92 
Aries 400 BB1 Traction ESKOM 400 1.00 0.00 0.00 
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Arnot Gen4 G.1 265.0 0.2 265.0 1.0 68.1 
Arnot Gen5 G.2 -265.00 0.22 265.00 -1.00 68.12 
Arnot Gen6 G.3 -508.95 -187.33 542.33 -0.94 121.87 
Synchronous Machine G.4 303.00 -187.59 356.37 0.85 80.08 
Synchronous 
Machine(2) 
G.5 51.00 2.51 51.06 1.00 23.00 
Camden Gen 5 G.6 170.00 -15.26 170.68 1.00 76.88 
Camden Gen 6 G.7 170.00 -15.26 170.68 1.00 76.88 
Camden Gen 7 G.8 170.00 -15.26 170.68 1.00 76.88 
Camden Gen 8 G.9 170.00 -15.13 170.67 1.00 76.88 
Gen 1(1) G.10 610.00 26.51 610.58 1.00 76.32 
Gen 2(1) G.11 610.00 26.51 610.58 1.00 76.32 
Gen 3 G.12 610.00 26.51 610.58 1.00 76.32 
Gen 4(1) G.13 610.00 26.51 610.58 1.00 76.32 
KN-G1 G.14 170.00 73.89 185.36 0.92 92.68 
KN-G2 G.15 170.00 73.89 185.36 0.92 92.68 
KN-G3 G.16 170.00 73.89 185.36 0.92 92.68 
KN-G4 G.17 170.00 73.89 185.36 0.92 92.68 
KN-G6 G.18 170.00 73.89 185.36 0.92 92.68 
Matimba Gen 5 G.19 -2085.87 31.99 2086.12 -1.00 260.76 
Matimba Gen 6 G.20 316.29 -59.10 321.76 0.98 40.22 
Synchronous 
Machine(4) 
G.21 260.42 319.46 412.15 0.63 206.08 
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From Terminal i 
Busbar 

















Aggeneis - Aries 
400_1 
L.1 Aggeneis 400 BB1(1) Aries 400 BB2 0.992 1.000 9.084 79.54538 
Aggeneis - Harib 
220kV 
L.2 Harib 220 Bus 
Aggeneis 220 
BB1 
0.997 0.980 10.909 65.02118 
Aggeneis - Harib 
220kV(1) 
L.3 Harib 220 Bus 
Aggeneis 220 
BB1 
0.997 0.980 11.151 65.02118 
Aries - Kokerboom 
400kV 
L.4 Kokerboom 400 Bus 1 Aries 400 BB2 0.928 1.000 13.006 103.8494 
Arnot - Maputo 
400kV 
L.5 Terminal(36) Maputo 400 BB 0.945 1.028 19.332 205.9504 
Camden - Edwaleni 
400kV 
L.6 Camden 400 BB2W 
Edwaleni 400 
BB1 
1.019 1.022 22.631 680 
Camden - 
Normandie 400_1 
L.7 Nomandie 400 BB1 
Camden 400 
BB2W 
1.008 1.019 17.333 195 
Edwaleni-Maputo 
400kV 
L.8 Edwaleni 400 BB1 Maputo 400 BB 1.022 1.028 21.325 479.7498 
Gabarone South - 
Segoditshane 132_1 
L.9 
Segoditshane 132 Bus 
1 
Gabarone South 
No.2 132 Bus 1 
0.960 0.964 26.723 96 
Gaborone South - 
Spitskop 132kV 
L.10 
Gabarone South No.2 
132 Bus 1 
Spitskop 132 
BB2A 
0.964 1.000 20.973 23.8921 
Harib - Kokerboom 
1 
L.11 Kokerboom 220 Bus Harib 220 Bus 0.931 0.997 23.179 124 
Harib - Kokerboom2 L.12 Kokerboom 220 Bus Harib 220 Bus 0.931 0.997 23.179 124 
Infulene - Matole 
275_1 
L.13 Infulene 275 BB1 Matola 275 BB1 1.024 1.025 11.155 190 
Insukamani-Phokoj 
400kV 
L.14 Phokoje 400 BB 
Insakumani 400 
Bus 1 
0.932 0.941 5.580 313.2951 
Kariba North-Kariba 
South 330 kV 
L.15 Kariba North 330kV 
Kariba South 
330 
1.001 1.000 78.598 1020 
Kariba North-Kariba 
South 330kV 
L.16 Kariba North 330kV 
Kariba South 
330 
1.001 1.000 72.553 1020 
Kariba South-
Bindura 330kV 
L.17 Kariba South 330 
Bindura 330kV 
bb1.2 
1.000 1.026 16.021 1019.755 
Maputo - Matola 
275_1 
L.18 Matola 275 BB1 Maputo 275 BB1 1.025 1.025 11.138 190.0823 
Matimba Phokoj 
400kV 
L.19 Phokoje 400 BB 
Matimba 400 
BB1 B6 
0.932 0.931 21.217 313.2951 
Matimba-Spitskop 
400_1S5 
L.20 Matimba 400 BB2 B3 
Spitskop 400 
BB1A 
0.931 0.929 13.500 2440 
Phokoje-S Phikwe 
220_2 
L.21 Phokoje 220 BB 
S. Phikiwe 22 
BB 
0.877 0.877 0.437 48.17146 
Phokoje-S. Phikwe 
220_1 
L.22 Phokoje 220 BB 
S. Phikiwe 22 
BB 




Segoditshane 220 Bus 
2 








0.960 1.000 22.732 96 
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4.3 Contingency Ranking  
4.3.1 Line Outage Contingency Ranking 
The contingency ranking was computed using the MATLAB coding (Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4) which depicts several line and busbar violations as formulated in Equation (2-
4 – 2-7). Contingency ranking algorithms can be classified into two groups; performance 
index and screening method. The performance index method uses scalar performance 
index to quantify the severity of contingency cases. The screening method is based on 
determining the margin between the voltage collapse point and the current operating in 
what is referred to as the voltage stability criteria  [37], [39], [38]. The algorithm adapted in 
this research is the performance index method and the procedure used for the contingency 
ranking is as follows: 
Step 1: Load flow is carried out in the networks pre-contingency state using the Newton 
Raphson iterative method under DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 
Step 2: Generate a fault in any one of the transmission lines (L.1) in the network resulting 
in the outage of that line and run a load flow analysis. 
Step 3: Using the generator, busbar and line profiles obtained from the post contingency 
analysis, apply necessary values to the MATLAB coding (Appendix 4) in order to get the 
PIP and PIV for the first line contingency C.L.1. 
Step 4: Generate another line contingency (C.L.2) in a different transmission line and run 
a load flow analysis. 
Step 5: Repeat steps 2 to 4 to acquire the PIP and PIV of the all the line contingencies in 
the network. 
Step 6: Arrange the several indices to identify which contingencies are more critical. 
 
The above steps are repeated in order to acquire the performance indices for the outage 
of the several generators in the network using the MATLAB coding in Appendix 5 and are 
labelled according to which generator is faulted example C.G.1 to indicate generator G1 
has a fault. 
The results obtained from the line contingency ranking are shown in and fig.4-24 with 
C.L.12 being the most critical and C.L.1 being the least severe. Picking only the six highest 
ranked performance indices (fig.4-25), a contingency analysis will then be run for each 
contingency case using DigSilent PowerFactory.  
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Table 4- 4: Line outage performance index 
Contingency PIV PIp  Total 
C.L.1 0.0215 0.1063 0.1278 
C.L.2 0.173 0.0839 0.2569 
C.L.3 0.1733 0.084 0.2573 
C.L.4 0.1642 0.0812 0.2454 
C.L.5 0.1368 0.1116 0.2484 
C.L.6 0.2007 0.0512 0.2519 
C.L.7 0.1406 0.1303 0.2709 
C.L.8 0.1846 0.0466 0.2312 
C.L.9 0.1235 0.0836 0.2071 
C.L.10 0.2154 0.0836 0.299 
C.L.11 0.211 0.0837 0.2947 
C.L.12 0.2227 0.0837 0.3064 
C.L.13 0.1718 0.0949 0.2667 
C.L.14 0.1586 0.0766 0.2352 
C.L.15 0.1718 0.0827 0.2545 
C.L.16 0.1718 0.0827 0.2545 
C.L.17 0.1795 0.0791 0.2586 
C.L.18 0.1694 0.0948 0.2642 
C.L.19  0.1675 0.0897 0.2572 
C.L.20 0.1744 0.0826 0.257 
C.L.21 0.1718 0.0827 0.2545 
C.L.22 0.1718 0.0827 0.2545 
C.L.23 0.1432 0.0753 0.2185 
C.L.24 0.1384 0.0837 0.2221 
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Figure 4- 24: Line outage contingency ranking 
 
 
Figure 4- 25: Highest rated line contingencies 
 
Even whilst the results obtained from the performance index does not show us exactly 
which elements have violated the thermal loadings and voltage limitations post 
contingency, it does however, allow pre-eminence be given to more severe cases which 
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4.3.2 Generator Outage Contingency Ranking 
From the depicted results in fig.4-26, we are able to detect that the generator outage that 
will cause the most violation is those associated with G.5, and the lowest being G.4. The 
six highest generator outage contingencies are presented in fig.4-27. 
 
Table 4- 5: Generator outage performance index 
Contingency PIv PIp PIq 
C.G.1 0.5 2.6883 3.1883 
C.G.2 0.5 2.6883 3.1883 
C.G.3 0.5 3.6726 4.1726 
C.G.4 0.5 2.6358 3.1235 
C.G.5 0.2813 4.1647 4.4459 
C.G.6 0.5 2.9591 3.4591 
C.G.7 0.5 2.9591 3.4591 
C.G.8 0.5 2.9591 3.4591 
C.G.9 0.5 2.9594 3.4594 
C.G.10 0.5 2.6936 3.1936 
C.G.11 0.5 2.6936 3.1936 
C.G.12 0.5 2.6936 3.1936 
C.G.13 0.5 2.6936 3.1936 
C.G.14 0.5 2.6349 3.1349 
C.G.15 0.5 2.6349 3.1349 
C.G.16 0.5 2.6349 3.1349 
C.G.17 0.5 2.6349 3.1349 
C.G.18 0.5 2.6349 3.1349 
C.G.19 0.5 2.6936 3.1936 
C.G.20 0.5 2.6358 3.1235 
C.G.21 0.2813 2.8887 3.1699 
C.G.22 0.5 2.6349 3.1349 
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Figure 4- 26: Generator outage performance index 
 
 
Figure 4- 27: Highest rated generator contingencies 
 
A contingency analysis will be run for the six highest contingencies to see in detail the 
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CHAPTER 5 
SAPP CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
The contingency analysis for each contingency case was carried out in the DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. The results that followed from each contingency analysis are represented 
in the figures below which represent the thermal loading, minimum voltage violation and 
maximum voltage violation results. 
 
5.1 Contingency ranking  
In chapter 4, it was discovered after contingency ranking that the highest rankings of 
violations in both the line and generator outages are as shown in table 5-1.  
 
 
Table 5- 1: Contingency analysis selection elements 
Contingency Name Element Type Element name Performance index 
C.L.12 Line Harib-Kokerboom 2 0.3064 
C.L.10 Line 
Gaborone South - Spitskop 
132kV 
0.299 
C.L.11 Line Harib - Kokerboom 1 0.2947 
C.L.7 Line Camden - Normandie 400_1 0.2709 
C.L.13 Line Infulene – Matole 275_1 0.2667 
C.L.18 Line Maputo – Matola 275_1 0.2642 
C.G.5 Generator Synchronous Machine(2) 4.4459 
C.G.3 Generator Arnot Gen6 4.1726 
C.G.9 Generator  Camden Gen 8 3.4594 
C.G.7 Generator Camden Gen 6 3.4591 
C.G.8 Generator Camden Gen 7 3.4591 
C.G.6 Generator Camden Gen 5 3.4591 
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The general aim of the contingency analysis is to detect areas of weakness in the network 
which can be strengthened by methods including transmission capacity increase and 
allows improvements in the transmission system that will enable the network to withstand 
disturbances.  
The results from table 5-1 are represented using four main graphs below which illustrate 
the prognosis of each separate simulation. The graphs include the SAPP model network 
graph, the substation busbar graph, the voltage violation graph and the thermal violation 
graph.  
5.2 SAPP Model Network Graph 
The SAPP model network graphs show the separate substations interconnected together 
to represent a mega substation. After each simulation, this graph shows the response of 
each substation with respect to the corresponding disturbance that occurs. The colour 
difference is a primary representation of the voltage drops and rise that occur in the 
busbars of each substation.   
 
5.3 Substation Busbar Network 
The substation busbar network reveals the connection within each substation. It shows all 
the connections which comprise the generating units, transformers, busbars, load, reactors 
and transmission lines connecting two or more substations. This graph shows exactly 
which of the internal components are affected by each contingency presenting either a 
thermal or voltage violation.  
 
5.4 Voltage Violation  
The voltage violation graph is a tabular representation of the busbars that have violated 
the voltage security limitations. It gives a comparison between the base case and the post 
contingency case so the user can easily identify how much of a voltage step or lag has 
taken place in the busbar.  
 
5.5 Thermal violations 
These graphs represent the thermal loading of the transmission lines that are beyond the 
specified security limits. Once again this graph gives a clear comparison between the base 
case and the post contingency case 
This is the analysis that is used for each of the different simulations that are run in this 
research. The visual aid makes it easy to set apart which sections of the network are 
undergoing changes post contingency and also gives a very clear comparison between 
pre contingency and post contingency.  
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5.6 Scenario 1: Contingency C.L.12 Harib – Kokerboom 2  
Figures 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 display the results that are obtained after the contingency C.L.12 has been run by inducing a fault and 
inactivating the Harib-Kokerboom 2 transmission line. Fig.5-1 represents the effect of an outage of line L.12 on the SAPP network. 
With comparison to the load flow graph (fig.4-14) which shows the pre contingency or base case graph of the SAPP network, we can 
see that even whilst the rest of the substations go unaffected, the NAMPOWER substation experiences an over voltage limit violation 
represented by the red colour. 
 
Figure 5- 1: SAPP network post contingency C.L.12 
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In comparison to the NAMPOWER load flow graph in fig.4-22, we can see from fig.5-2 which is under contingency C.L.12 that the 
Kokerboom 400 Bus1 busbar rises above the secure voltage limit by the change in colour from blue to red. The Kokerboom 220 Bus 
experienced a voltage drop below the secure limit and is indicated by a blue busbar. 
 
Figure 5- 2: NAMPOWER substation network post contingency C.L.12 
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Fig.5-3 Shows the voltage violation that takes place in the Kokerboom 400 Bus 1 after the C.L12 contingency. The voltage base is 
indicated at a per unit value of 0.928 which is below the required security limits and the post contingency voltage rises to 1.124 p.u, 






















Kokerboom 400 Bus 1 NAMPOWER 1.12 0.20 0.93
 Base Case and Post Voltage         
[0.928 p.u. - 1.124 p.u.]
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5.7 Scenario 2: Contingency C.L.10 Gabarone South – Spitskop 132kV 
Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6 below show the post contingency results obtained after the contingency C.L.10 has been run by inducing a 
fault in the Gaborone South – Spitskop 132kV transmission line. In Fig.5-4 we examine the outage of line L.10 in which we see the 
BPC substation is affected by dropping below the voltage limit represented by the blue colour. NAMPOWER substation shows a 
voltage drop occurs by the alteration of colour from green to blue in one section and from yellow to green in the other section. A 
section of the ZESA substation experienced a voltage drop below the security limit.  
 
Figure 5- 4: SAPP network post contingency C.L.10 
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Fig.5-5 on the other hand shows that all the busbars in the network experience voltage drops below the secure limit when under 
contingency C.L.10. 
 
Figure 5- 5: BPC substation network post contingency C.L.10 
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Fig.5-6 displays the voltage violations caused from contingency C.L.10. A total of 8 busbars undergo a change of voltage levels post 
contingency. The first busbar, Segoditshane 220 Bus 1, is seen to have a base voltage of 0.954 p.u which then drops to 0.770 p.u 
post contingency. This change in voltage is represented by a differentiation in colour as the voltage drops from a voltage that is within 
the required security limits to one that is not. The bar in the graph is multi coloured, green in the far right side to show the voltage lies 
within the specified security limit to a dark red colour in the far left to indicate that the voltage now falls outside the required security 
limit. This proves true for the next three busbars that follow. The Phokojoe 220 BB busbar in the same figure however has a different 
set of colours. The bar corresponding to Phokojoe 220 BB is coloured bright red in the far right to show that its base case voltage of 
0.877 p.u is not within specifies limits and drops further to 0.833 p.u represented by a dark red colour in the far left of the bar. This 
analysis can be used to interpret the three busbars that follow which all have base voltages below the security limit and drop even 
further. 
 












Segoditshane 220 Bus 1(1) BPC 0.770 -0.184 0.954
Segoditshane 220 Bus 2 BPC 0.770 -0.184 0.954
Gabarone Sth No.2 132B1 BPC 0.771 -0.193 0.964
Segoditshane 132 Bus 1 BPC 0.771 -0.189 0.960
Phokoje 220 BB BPC 0.833 -0.044 0.877
S. Phikiwe 22 BB BPC 0.833 -0.044 0.877
Phokoje 400 BB BPC 0.907 -0.025 0.932
Insakumani 400 Bus 1 ZESA 0.914 -0.026 0.941
Base Case and Post Voltage         
[0.770 p.u. - 0.964 p.u.]
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5.8 Scenario 3: Contingency C.L.11 Harib – kokerboom 1 
Figures 5-7, 5-8 and 5-9 show the results that are obtained after contingency C.L.11 is run and considering Harib-Kokerboom 1 faulty 
and inactive. Once again the NAMPOWER substation experiences an over voltage limit violation represented by the red colour.  
 
Figure 5- 7: SAPP network post contingency C.L.11 
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Similar to the previous case, fig.5-8 shows the kokerboom 400 Bus1 busbar rise above the secure voltage limit by the change in 




Figure 5- 8: NAMPOWER substation network post contingency C.L.11 
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In fig.5-9 the voltage base is indicated at a per unit value of 0.93 which is below the required security limits and the post contingency 
voltage rises to 1.12 p.u, which is above the required security limit of 1.05 p.u. This is represented by a red bar in the graph to 
indicate that a violation has occurred. 
 
 



















Kokerboom 400 Bus 1 NAMPOWER 1.12 0.20 0.93
 Base Case and Post Voltage         
[0.928 p.u. - 1.124 p.u.]
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5.9 Scenario 4: Contingency C.L.7 (Camden - Normandie 400_1) 
Figures 5-10, 5-11 and 5-12 display the results that are obtained when the contingency C.L.7 has been run after considering the 
Camden-Normandie transmission line faulty and inactive. The upper section of the NAMPOWER substation experiences a voltage 
drop indicated by the blue colour whilst the lower section now has its voltage within limits. 
 
 
Figure 5- 10: SAPP network post contingency C.L.7 
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Figure 5-11 indicates the transmission line that is presumed to be undergoing a fault, however, no significant changes are seen in the 
figure in comparison with the network’s pre contingency state in figure 4-22. It should be noted however, that figure 5-11 has been 
enlarged so as to clearly indicate and focus on the area where the contingency occurred.  
 
 
Figure 5- 11: ESKOM C substation post contingency C.L.7 
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Fig.5 -12 shows the results after the simulation of contingency C.L.7. From the figure we see that the transformer Arnot Gen T6 has a 
base case loading of 135% and increases to 176.9%, both of which are beyond the security limit and hence are represented by a bar 
that is coloured bright red and dark red to show the increment in violation. In the same figure is the Arnot Gen T3 transformer that has 
a loading base case of 88.7% represented by a dark green colour in the bar and drops to 84.4% post contingency and is represented 
by a light green colour as they are both in the specified security limit. 
 
 












Gen1 ESKOM 296.0 296.0 296.0
Arnot Gen T6 ESKOM 176.9 176.9 135.0
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 88.7 88.7 88.7
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 84.4 84.4 88.7
Kariba North T - 1(1) ZESCO 88.4 88.4 88.4
Kariba North T-3 ZESCO 88.0 88.0 88.0
Kariba North T1 ZESCO 88.0 88.0 88.0
Kariba North T-1 ZESCO 88.0 88.0 88.0
Kariba North T-2 ZESCO 88.0 88.0 88.0
2-Winding Transformer(3) ESKOM 86.6 86.6 86.6
2-Winding Transformer(2) ESKOM 86.6 86.6 86.6
2-Winding Transformer(1) ESKOM 86.6 86.6 86.6
Gen 3 T3 ESKOM 86.6 86.6 86.6
Base Case and Continuous Loading        
[0.0 % - 296.0 %]
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5.10 Scenario 5: Contingency C.L.13 (Infulene – Matole 275_1) 
Figures 5-13, 5-15 and 5-15 show the results post contingency C.l.13, where the Infulene-Matola 275_1 transmission line is 
considered faulty. Fig.5-13 shows that the SEB substation experiences a voltage rise slightly above the required security limit whilst 
the upper part of the NAMPOWER substation changes from a light green to blue indicating a voltage drop. The upper part of the 
ESKOM network changes from a light blue to green in colour indicating a voltage increase within the required limits.  
 
Figure 5- 13: SAPP network post contingency C.L.13 
70 | P a g e  
 
Figure 5-14 shows that no significant changes occurred in the EDM substation post contingency but does indicated the transmission 




Figure 5- 14: EDM substation network post contingency C.L13 
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Figure5-15 shows that the Camden Gen 8T generator experienced a thermal loading increase 79.98% to 112.03 which is over the 
accepted secure limit.   
 










Gen1 ESKOM 296.05 296.05 296.05
Arnot Gen T6 ESKOM 135.01 76.44 135.01
Camden Gen 8T ESKOM 112.03 112.03 79.98
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 88.72 76.46 88.72
Kariba North T - 1(1) ZESCO 88.38 88.38 88.38
Kariba Borth T1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-2 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-3 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Karina North T-1(2) ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
2-Winding Transformer(1) ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
2-Winding Transformer(2) ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
2-Winding Transformer(3) ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
Gen 3 T3 ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
Base Case and Continuous Loading
[0 % - 296 %]
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5.11 Scenario  6: Contingency C.L.18 (Maputo – Matola 275_1) 
Figures 5-16, 5-17 and 5-18 display the results obtained post contingnecy C.L.18 after the Maputo – Matola 275_1 is considered 
faulty and inactive. The results reflect a similarity with those obatined from the contingency C.L.13 which interpret that the severity of 
violation caused by both contingency cases is almost identical. This is also proved in the derivation of the contingency ranking 
showing a slight difference between the performance index of C.1.13 and C.L.18 rated at 0.2667 and 0.2642 respectively.  
 
Figure 5- 16: SAPP network post contingency C.L.18 
73 | P a g e  
 
Figure 5-17 shows no significant changes in the EDM substation post contingency but does indicated the transmission lines that are 
interconnected to other substations in which voltage drops and increase were experienced.  
 
 
Figure 5- 17: EDM substation network post contingency C.L.18 
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Fig.5-18 shows the scenario after contingency C.L.18 is run. Only one thermal violation was recorded and that is in the Camden Gen 
8T transformer which shows a thermal loading increase from 79.98% to 112.03%. This is represented in the bar by a bar that is 
coloured green and converts into a red colour to show thermal overload has occurred. 
 
 










Gen1 ESKOM 296.05 296.05 296.05
Arnot Gen T6 ESKOM 135.01 76.44 135.01
Camden Gen 8T ESKOM 112.03 112.03 79.98
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 88.72 76.46 88.72
Kariba North T - 1(1) ZESCO 88.38 88.38 88.38
Kariba Borth T1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-2 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-3 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Karina North T-1(2) ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
2-Winding Transformer(1) ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
2-Winding Transformer(2) ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
2-Winding Transformer(3) ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
Gen 3 T3 ESKOM 86.65 86.65 86.65
Base Case and Continuous Loading
[0 % - 296 %]
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5.12 Scenario 7: Contingency C.G.5 (Synchronous Machine (2)) 
Figures 5-19, 5-20 and 5-21 show the results obtained when the generator Synchronous machine (2) is considered faulty and no 
longer generating power. The results in fig.5-19 show several voltage violation. The BPC and lower section of the ZESA substation 
indicate an extreme voltage drop below 0.9p.u. The upper section of the NAMPOWER substation post contingency changed from 
green to blue indicating a voltage drop whilst the lower section of the area changes from yellow to green also indicating a voltage 
drop. Lastly, the ESKOM section connected to the NAMPOWER substation shows a voltage rise.  
 
Figure 5- 19: SAPP network post contingency C.G.5 
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Figure 5-20 shows that post contingency, a voltage drop below 0.9 p.u in all the busbars of the BPC network occurs. 
 
 
Figure 5- 20: BPC substation network post contingency C.G.5 
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Figure 5-21 shows voltage drops were experienced in the Segoditshane 200 Bus 1, Segoditshane 200 Bus 2, Gabarone No2 132 Bus 
1 and the Segoditshane 132 Bus 1 all of which were within the secure limit pre contingency and dropped lower that limit post 
contingency. The other four buses; Phokojoe 220 BB, S. Phikiwe 22 BB, Phokojoe 400 BB and Insakumani 400 Bus 1 were all below 
the acceptable secure limit pre contingency and dropped even lower post contingency.  
 












Segoditshane 220 Bus1 BPC 0.77 -0.18 0.95
Segoditshane 220 Bus 2 BPC 0.77 -0.18 0.95
Gabarone Sth No.2132Bus1 BPC 0.77 -0.19 0.96
Segoditshane 132 Bus 1 BPC 0.77 -0.19 0.96
Phokoje 220 BB BPC 0.83 -0.04 0.88
S. Phikiwe 22 BB BPC 0.83 -0.04 0.88
Phokoje 400 BB BPC 0.91 -0.03 0.93
Insakumani 400 Bus 1 ZESA 0.91 -0.03 0.94
Kokerboom 400 Bus 1 NAMPOWER 0.93 0.00 0.93
Spitskop 400 BB1A ESKOM 0.93 0.00 0.93
Spitskop 400 BB2A ESKOM 0.93 0.00 0.93
Matimba 400 BB1 B6 ESKOM 0.93 0.00 0.93
Matimba 400 BB2 B3 ESKOM 0.93 0.00 0.93
Kokerboom 220 Bus NAMPOWER 0.93 0.00 0.93
Base Case and Post Voltage         
[0.770 p.u. - 0.964 p.u.]
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5.13 Scenario 8: Contingency C.G.3 (Arnot Gen6) 
Figures 5-22, 5-23, 5-24 and 5-25 display the results obtained post contingency C.G.3 where the Arnot Gen 6 generator is considered 
faulty and inactive.  Fig.5-22 shows that the SEB and EDM substations experience a voltage increase higher than 1.1 p.u and the 
NAMPOWER experiences both a voltage increase and drop in its substation. Addistionally the section of the ESKOM substation 
connected to the NAMPOWER substation experiences a voltage slight rise.  
 
 
Figure 5- 22: SAPP network post contingency C.G.3 
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Figure 5-23 shows that post contingency all the busbars in the EDM substation experiences voltage rise beyond 1.1 p.u.   
 
Figure 5- 23: EDM substation network post contingency C.G.3 
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Figure 5-24 shows that the SEB network also experiences a voltage rise of over 1.1 p.u in all its busbars.  
 
 
Figure 5- 24: SEB substation network post contingency C.G.3 
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Figure 5-25 shows the values of voltage increase that the several busbars in the SAPP network experienced post contingency.  
 
 














Maputo 400 BB EDM 1.22 0.20 1.03
Maputo 275 BB1 EDM 1.22 0.20 1.03
Matola 275 BB1 EDM 1.22 0.20 1.02
Infulene 275 BB1 EDM 1.22 0.20 1.02
Matola 66BB1 EDM 1.17 0.19 0.98
Edwaleni 400 BB1 SEB 1.12 0.10 1.02
Edwaleni 132 BB1S SEB 1.10 0.10 1.00
Edwaleni 132 BB2 SEB 1.10 0.10 1.00
Edwaleni 40 BB2 SEB 1.10 0.10 1.00
Edwaleni 132 BB1N SEB 1.10 0.10 1.00
 Base Case and Post Voltage         
[0.976 p.u. - 1.224 p.u.]
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5.14 Scenario 9:Contingency C.G.9 (Camden Gen 8), C.G.7(Camden Gen 6), C.G.8(Camden Gen 7),          
C.G.6(Camden Gen 5) 
Figures 5-26, 5-27 and 5-28 show the results obtained from the contingencies C.G.9, C.G.7, C.G.8 and C.G.6 in the Camden Gen 8, 
Camden Gen 6, Camden Gen 7 and Camden Gen 5 generators (respectively) are considered faulty. The displayed results applied for 
each separate contingency case, this is also in correlation with the results obtained in table 5-1 in which the performance index for all 
these cases were equivalent, in the exception of C.G.9 which varied slightly.  
 
Figure 5- 26: SAPP network post contingency C.G.9, C.G.7, C.G.8, C.G.6 
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The figure 5-27 shows the ESKOM C network in which the Camden Gen 8 generator and the Arnot Gen T3 transformer both 
experience an increase in thermal loading.  
 
Figure 5- 27: ESKOM C substation network post contingency C.G.9, C.G.7, C.G.8, C.G.6 
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Figure 5-28 shows the Camden Gen 8T generator and the Arnot Gen T3 transformer becoming overloaded post contingency.   
 
 











Gen1 ESKOM 296.05 296.05 296.05
Camden Gen 8T ESKOM 238.99 238.99 79.98
Arnot Gen T6 ESKOM 135.01 135.01 135.01
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 100.71 100.71 88.72
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 88.72 88.72 88.72
Kariba North T - 1(1) ZESCO 88.38 88.38 88.38
Kariba North T - 1(1) ZESCO 88.38 88.38 88.38
Kariba Borth T1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba Borth T1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-2 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Base Case and Continuous Loading        
[0.0 % - 296.0 %]
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5.15 Scenario 10: Contingency C.G.10 (Gen 3) 
Figures 5-29, 5-30 and 5-31 show the results obtained from contingency C.G.10. Even though not part of the six highest 
contingencies, these results were placed to display a broader range of results that were obtained after the contingency simulations 
were run. The results show the response of the network to a disturbance cause in the Gen 3 generator.  
 
 
Figure 5- 29: SAPP network post contingency C.G.10 
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Figure 5-30 shows no significant difference in any of the components post contingency.  
 
 
Figure 5- 30: ESKOM C substation post contingency C.G.10 
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The fig.5-31 shows that post contingency, the Gen1 generator thermal loading from 296.05% to an even higher 346.27%. This 
explained why no change was seen in fig.5-30 previously as the generator was already overloaded.  
 
 











Gen1 ESKOM 346.27 346.27 296.05
Arnot Gen T6 ESKOM 135.01 135.01 135.01
Arnot Gen T3 ESKOM 88.72 88.72 88.72
Kariba North T - 1(1) ZESCO 88.38 88.38 88.38
Kariba Borth T1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-1 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-2 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Kariba North T-3 ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
Karina North T-1(2) ZESCO 88.05 88.05 88.05
2-Winding Transformer(1) ESKOM 86.65 86.57 86.65
2-Winding Transformer(2) ESKOM 86.65 86.57 86.65
2-Winding Transformer(3) ESKOM 86.65 86.57 86.65
Gen 3 T3 ESKOM 86.65 86.57 86.65
Base Case and Continuous Loading
[0 % - 346 %]
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Table 5-2 shows collectively the several elements that were affected after each named 
contingency was run. 
 





Element type Status  
C.L.12 Kokerboom 400 
Bus1  
Busbar A voltage step of 0.196p.u is experienced increasing the 
post contingency busbar voltage to 1.124p.u 
C.L.10 Segoditshane 
220 Bus 1 
Busbar A voltage drop was experienced from 0.954p.u to the out 
of limit 0.770p.u 
Segoditshane 
220 Bus 2 




Busbar A voltage drop from 0.964p.u to 0.771p.u 
Segoditshane 
132 Bus1 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.960 p.u to 0.771 p.u 
Phokojoe 220 
BB 
Busbar A voltage drop from the already out of limit 0.877 p.u to a 
further 0.833 p.u 
S. Phikiwe 22 BB Busbar A voltage drop from 0.877p.u to 0.833 p.u 
Insakumani 400 
Bus 1 




Busbar A voltage drop from 0.932 p.u to 0.907 p.u 
C.L.11 Kokerboom 400 
Bus 1 
Busbar The voltage at the busbar increases post contingency to 
1.124 p.u 
C.L.7 Arnot Gen T6 Transformer The thermal loading increases to 176.9% post 
contingency 
Arnot Gen T3 Transformer The thermal loading drops slightly to 84.4% 
C.L.13 Camden Gen 8T Transformer The thermal loading increases to 112% from 80% 
C.L.18 Camden Gen 8T Transformer The thermal loading increases to 112% from 80% 
C.G.5 Segoditshane 
220 Bus1  
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.954 p.u to 0.770 p.u 
Segositshane 
220 Bus 2 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.954 p.u to 0.770 p.u 
89 | P a g e  
 
C.G.5 Gabarone South 
No.2 132 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.964 p.u to 0.771 p.u 
Segoditshane 
132 Bus 1 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.960 p.u to 0.771 p.u 
S. Phikiwe 22BB Busbar A voltage drop from 0.877 p.u TO 0.822 p.u 
Phokojoe 220 
BB 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.877 p.u to 0.833 p.u 
Phokojoe 400 
BB 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.932 p.u to 0.907 p.u 
Insakumani 400 
Bus 1 
Busbar A voltage drop from 0.941 p.u to 0.914 p.u  
C.G.3 Maputo 400 BB  Busbar A voltage increase is experienced from 1.028p.u to 1.224 
p.u 
Maputo 275 BB1 Busbar A voltage increase from 1.025p.u to 1.224 p.u 
Infulene 275 BB1  Busbar A voltage increase from 1.024 p.u to 1.223 p.u 
Matola 66 BB1 Busbar A volatgte increase from 0.976 p.u to 1.165 p.u 
Edwaleni 400 
BB1 
Busbar A voltage increase from 1.022 p.u to 1.122 p.u 
Edwaleni 132 BB 
1S 
Busbar A voltage increase from 0.996 p.u to 1.099 p.u 
Edwaleni 132 
BB2  
Busbar A voltage increase from 0.996 p.u to 1.099 p.u 
Edwaleni 400 
BB2 
Busbar A voltage increase from 0.996 p.u to 1.099 p.u 
Edwaleni 132 
BB1N 
Busbar A voltage increase from 0.996 p.u to 1.099 p.u 
2-wind8ing 
transformer(5) 








Transformer A thermal loading increase is experienced from 70.4% to 
86.6% 
C.G.20 Camden Gen 8T Transformer The thermal loading rose drastically from 80% to 239%  





Camden Gen 8T  A drastic thermal load increase from 80% to 239% 
Arnot Gen T3  Thermal loading increase from 87% to 100.7% 
C.G.10 2 Winding 
transformer 
 A thermal loading load is experienced from an 
exceptionally high 296% to an even higher 346% 
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CHAPTER 6 
POWER SYSTEM SECURITY ENHANCEMENT 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
There are several methods that are used to enhance the security of power networks that 
do not conform to the security limits after unforeseen disturbances occurs, some of these 
methods include; 
 Integration of HVDC links into the power grid. In addition to its obvious advantage 
of maintaining reliability and security, HVDC transmission is also cost effective. As 
compared to HVAC transmission, its cost reduces as the length of the transmission 
line increases. HVDC continues to gain popularity globally because of its many 
advantages and due to technological advances which make it more practical than it 
was previously makes it more desirable than HVAC.    
 Using synchrophasors. An advanced synchrophasor is a device that measures the 
electrical waves on the grid using a common time source for synchronization. This 
technological device is one that has only recently become of interest and is used in 
the power network to enhance reliability and is likely to gain even more popularity 
with due time. Some of the applications that make the advanced synchrophasor a 
good option include[56]; 
 Improved power system monitoring and visualization to aid power system 
operators’ situational awareness and assist in forestalling a grid collapse 
through better recognition and response to evolving grid events 
 Validation and derivation of system parameters used in power system models 
and analytical tools to design and operate a more reliable grid 
 Enhance grid throughput and utilization of existing grid assets. 
 Faster and improved forensic analysis following a disturbance that impacts the 
power system, especially one that results in a blackout. 
 All of the above results help in improving reliability, power quality, asset 
utilization and efficiency in grid planning and operations.   
 Integrating FACTS into the grid. These are devices that are used to increase 
controllability and enhance the transmission capability of existing interconnections. 
FACTS devices are categorised into either series compensators or shunt 
compensators. Series compensators  
 Strategic placement of new interconnections. Theses transmission lines are often 
referred to as redundant transmission lines as they are used only in the event that 
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the primary transmission line is unable to transfer power due to a fault or 
disturbance and an alternative route is needed to transfer power.  
 
6.1 Security Enhancement of the SAPP Network Post Contingency C.L.10 
(Gaborone south – spitskop)  
 
In order to enhance the security of the SAPP network after the contingency C.L.10, a 
shunt capacitor rated at 50Mvar was placed in the BPC network in order to inject reactive 
power into the network to increase the voltage profile. Placement of security enhancement 
tools is always placed on weakest busbars or points of disturbance[57]. The results show 
that the BPC network busbars are increased to a level within the required security limit. 
This can be seen in fig.6-1 which shows the busbars with the green colour to indicate that 
they are approximately 1.00 p.u. The figure shows the placement of the shunt filter labelled 
Gab – Spitskop shunt located on the Phokojoe 220 BB.  
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Figure 6- 1: BPC substation after implementation of security enhancement using shunt capacitor post contingency C.L.10 (Gaborone south – spitskop) 
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The fig.6-2 shows the SAPP network after strategic placement of the shunt capacitor to enhance the security of the network. The 
substations that dropped previously below the secure voltage post contingency are restored to voltage levels within the accepted 
range, indicated by the colour change. 
 
 
Figure 6- 2: SAPP network after implementation of security enhancement using shunt capacitor post contingency C.L.10 (Gaborone South-Spitskop) 
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Another analysis was run in which an SVC of the same rating (50Mvar) was placed in the same position as the shunt capacitor. The 
results obtained from the BPC network after the SVC is placed to enhance the voltage profile is displayed in fig 6-3. The SVC, labeled 
Phokojoe SVC is located on the Phokojoe 220 BB busbar. The SVC increases the voltage profile of the previously low voltages 
obtained post contingency.  
 
Figure 6- 3: BPC substation after implementation of security enhancement using SVC post contingency C.L.10 (Gaborone south – spitskop) 
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Table 6-1 shows the comparison in the value of the voltages after the contingency C.L.10 
occurred and the results after the shunt capacitor and SVC were placed in the network to 
enhance the network security.  
 
Table 6- 1: Busbar voltages before and after security enhancements post contingnecy C.L.10 (Gaborone South 
- Spitskop) 
Busbar name Voltage before security 
enhance (p.u) 
Voltage after application 
of shunt capacitor (p.u) 
Voltage after 
application of SVC (p.u) 
Segoditshane 220 Bus 1 0.77 1.02 1.02 
Segoditshane 220 Bus 2 0.77 1.02 1.02 
Gaborone South No2 132 B1 0.77 1.02 1.01 
Segoditshane 132 Bus 1 0.77 1.02 1.01 
Phokojoe 220 BB 0.83 1.01 1.00 
S. Phikiwe 22 BB 0.83 1.01 1.00 
Phokojoe 400 BB 0.91 1.00 1.00 
Insukumani 400 Bus 1 0.91 1.01 1.00 
 
It can be seen from table 6-1 that the results obtained after security enhancement using 
both the shunt capacitor and the SVC were similar. The table shows an improvement in 
the networks security by 23.6% using the shunt capacitor and by 22.87% using the SVC. 
Inspite its slightly higher level of security increment, the shunt capacitor is a more 
desirable option because it is more economical than the most FACTS devices, the SVC 
included. A comparison can be seen in table 6-2 which shows the price in US$ per Kvar 
[58] in the global market. The advantage the SVC has over the shunt capacitor, however, 
is that beyond a certain level of compensation it is still able to maintain a good voltage 
regulation which is not possible with the shunt capacitor. The shunt capacitor delivers 
reactive power that is proportional to the square of the terminal voltage, thus creating a 
problem when/if the terminal voltage drops too low.  
 
Table 6- 2: Comparative prices of shunt capacitor,SVC's and STATCOM's in US$ 
Shunt controller Cost (US$) 
Shunt capacitor 8/Kvar 
SVC 40/Kvar 
STATCOM 50/Kvar 
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6.2 Security Enhancement of the SAPP Network Post Contingency C.L.12 
(Harib-Kokerboom2) 
The shunt reactor is applied in the C.L.12 (Harib-Kokerboom 2) contingency in which an 
overvoltage was experienced in the busbars after a disturbance occurred in the Harib-
Kokerboom 2 transmission line. After the disturbance occurs in the line there is an 
increase in the reactive power causing an increase in the voltage profile. The shunt reactor 
is used to absorb or consume the reactive power reducing the voltage profile of the line.  
There was a shunt reactor already present in the network connected to the Kokerboom 
400 bus1 busbar pre contingnecy with a rated reactive power of 100 Mvar. Since less 
reactive power was needed in the network in order to drop the volatge profile, this value 
was reduced to 70Mvar. This resulted in a voltage drop in in the busbars to the acceptable 
secure limit. Fig 6-4 shows the NAMPOWER substation after the securitry enhancement 
has been applied. The shunt reactor that was adjusted is labeled kokerboom 400 RX1and 
is connected to the Kokerboom 400 bus 1 busbar. 
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Figure 6- 4: NAMPOWER substation after security enhancement implementation post contingency C.L.12 (Harib - Kokerboom 2) 
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Fig.6-5 shows the SAPP network after the security enhancement post contingency C.L.12. Most of the substations are restored to the 
correct value of voltages within the accepted secure limits as indicated by the blue and green colours. 
 
 
Figure 6- 5: SAPP substation after security enhancement implementation post contingency C.L.12 (Harib - Kokerboom 2) 
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Table 6-3 displays the value of the busbar voltage before and after the compensation of the kokerboom 2 using the shunt reactor. 
Before compensation the busbar voltage was beyond the required 1.05p.u required limit but dropped to 0.95p.u which is within the 
security limit.  
 
Table 6- 3: Busbar voltage of the Kokerboom busbar1 before and after security enhancement post contingency C.L.12 
Busbar name Before compensation After compensation 
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CHAPTER 7 




The SAPP network was modelled and built using DIgSILENT PowerFactory. The entire 
SAPP network, consisting of 1407 busbars (Appendix 1) incurred computational 
constraints due to the size of the network. Therefore, the model was reduced to only 
include the path that is directly used by SAPP in the transferring of power from one 
member state to the next and consisted only 58 busbars (Appendix 2). The simplified 
network was modelled to facilitate the HV network consisting of transmission voltage levels 
of 132kV, 220kV, 330kV and 400kV. 
The contingency ranking method used in this paper to determine the severity of security 
violations in the SAPP network is very systematic and methodological and can be applied 
to several networks, both larger and smaller, in order to comprehensively study several 
types of first level contingencies. This is reflected in the correlation of results yielded from 
the MATLAB codes and the contingency analysis graphs simulated in DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. The simulations were focused on the primary contingency disturbance (N-1 
criterion) of the generators and transmission lines in the network because these are the 
highest recorded faults that are likely to occur in any power network. The vulnerability of 
the SAPP network is exposed after the contingency analysis simulation of the designed 
model. The results attained not only reveal the extent to which the power network is 
unsecure in accordance with the SAPP transmission criteria but also reveal the severity 
with which each exact component is affected after each possible disturbance. These 
disturbances lead to differed levels of security severities that are characterized by voltage 
and thermal loading discrepancies. From the results obtained from the simulations the 
most severe were those induced by the Harib-Kokerboom 1 transmission line and the 
Synchronous machine (2) generator which both led to voltage and thermal loading 
violations.  
This research highlights the SAPP networks weak spots and this allows for the necessary 
reinforcements in these areas of the network that will mitigate and prevent the problems 
that are caused by various disturbances. This research demonstrates the use of shunt 
capacitors and shunt reactors as being the most necessary security enhancement tools 
that can be used for the disturbances encountered. The factors taken into consideration 
were the levels to which the busbar voltages had either dropped and/or increased to post 
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7.2 Future work 
Finally, other encouraged works include performing a further study by considering the 
reaction of the network when an N-1-1 contingency occurs. This is a secondary 
contingency in which more than one element is outaged at each instance for example, any 
two transmission lines, or two generators and so on. This will prove highly advantageous 
with the growing complexity of power networks and the increased probability of the 
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Appendix 1. SAPP Base case system summary before network was minimized. 
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Appendix 3.  Line outage coding using MATLAB 
% Active power performance index (PIp) 
% Vi is the Voltage at bus i by NR load flow 
Vi=[0.992,0.997,0.997,0.928,0.968,1.019,1.018,0.96,0.964,0.931,0.931,1.02
9,0.932,1.001,1.001,1,1.03,0.932,0.931,0.877,0.877,0.954,0.96;]; 
% Vj is the Voltage at bus J by NR load flow 
Vj=[1,0.98,0.98,1,1.033,1.018,1.033,0.964,1,0.997,0.997,1.03,0.941,1,1,1.
026,1.031,0.931,0.929,0.877,0.877,0.877,1;]; 
% X is the Reactance of the line connecting bus I and j in p.u 
X=[0.357,0.263,0.256,0.589,0.231,0.216,0.233,0.026,0.354,0.59,0.59,0.022,
0.33,0.002,0.003,0.612,0.022,0.281,0.011,0.014,0.014,0.694,0.351;]; 
% Pimax is the MW maximun capacity of line I in p.u 
Pimax= [Vi.*Vj./X]; 
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% W is the real non-negative weighting factor  
W=1; 
% n is the Penalty function 
n=1; 




%Reactive power performance index PIV is calculated using the equations 
below 
%Visp is the specified voltage of each busbar which can also be referred 
to as the nominal voltage which is normally 1 p.u 
Visp=1; 




% PIV is found by the formular 





Appendix 4. Generator outage MATLAB coding  
% The generator outage  
Active power performance index (PIp) 
% Vi Voltage at bus i by NR load flow 
Vi=[1.03,1.03,1.03,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1.03,1,1;]; 




Qimax=[0.432,0.432,0.378,0.437,0.437,0.437,0.4  0.4 0.4 0.4 
0.45,0.45,0.45,0.45 0.45,0.45,0.4,0.4,0.378,1,0.4]; 
% W is the real non-negative weighting factor  
W=1; 
% n Penalty function 
n=1; 
% PIp 
% Qi max is the Reactive power limit at bus I in p.u 




%Visp is the specified voltage of each busbar which can also be referred 
to as the nominal voltage which is normally 1 p.u 
Visp=1; 
% dvilim is the voltage deviation limit 
dvilim=[0.03,0.03,0.03,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0.03,0,0;]; 
% PIV of the generator outage is found using the equation belo 
PIv = [w/2*n]*[(abs(Vi) - abs(Visp))/dvilim].^(2.*n); 
% Summation of all calculated values 
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PIvsum=sum(PIv) 
% hence the generator outage performance index is found by adding the two 
equations as shown below 
PIq=PIvsum +PIpsum 
 
 
